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SUPPLEMENT TO POOL MEMORANDUM
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Ronald

October 30, 1986

I

No. 86-341, Ft. Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne

The

able memo-writer

questions are substantial.'
ERISA:

It seems

I

e

recommends

recommend

to me

that a

a

note.

Although

the

state statute requiring

payment of severance pay does not necessarily create a "benefit

-----

' ·

plan" within the meaning of ERISA. No other 6ourt has dealt with
..----~
this precise situation. .
The result s~E!ms probably correct,
though there certainly is some tension with the statutory text.
l

The word "plan" must have some content.

A flat requirement that

2.

employers pay lump-sum severance pay does not seem to raise the
questions

that motivated

passage of ERISA

in

the

first

place.

Thus, I agree with the court below.
NLRA:
a

requirement

I think the NLRA contention is meritless.
that

employers pay severance pay

Surely

is one of "the

myriad of state laws [in existence when the NLRA was passed] that
set minimum labor standards, but were unrelated in any way to the
processes
Life, 105

of

s.

bargaining
Ct., at 2398.

or

self-organization."

Metropolitan

I do not understand how this require-

ment has any effect on collective bargaining.

It simply removes

this question from the negotiating table.
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Conference
List 1, sheet 1
No. 86-341
FT. HALIFAX PACKING CO., INC.
(employer)

Roberts,

v.

COYNE, DIRECTOR, ETC. (Dir.
State/Civ.
of State Bur. Labor Standards
& employees granted severance pay)
1.

SUMMARY:

Appnt

challenges,

under

Retirement Income Security Act of 197
Labor Relations Act

Timely

the

Employment

and the National

( "NLRA") ,. the award of severance pay under

state law to former employees.
2.

FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW:

Appnt began packaging and

processing poultry in Winslow, Maine in 1972.

On May 23, 1981,

appnt ceased processing operations at the Winslow plant and layed
off most of
~

its workforce.

At the time of closing, appnt had

over 100 individuals on the payroll.

Many of the employees were

DFW S\=Q (<;~ ~uM~~)~

- 2 represented

by

Local

385

of

the

Amalgamated

Meatcutters

and

Butcher Workmen of North America {"Local 385") and had a contract
with appnt.

This contract had effective dates from June 2, 1979 ~11~

to June 2, 1982 and contained no provision for severance pay.

-- ----r

At

the time of closing, appnt had no contract or agreement regarding
severance pay that governed any of the layed-off employees.
the fall of 1981, appnt,

believing that reopening was possible,

sought concessions from Local
the union contract.

In

385 in the form of amendments to

The amendments, inter alia, sought to add a

severance pay provision to the contract that would shield appnt
from severance pay liability for union members under 26 Me. Rev.
Stat.

Ann.

§625-B 1 in the event

the plant

Local

385

signed

on Nov.

lsec ·

the

agreement

1,

reopened.
1981,

Although

appnt

provides in part:
"2.
Severance Pay.
Any employer who relocates or
1nates a covered establishment shall be liable to
his employees for severance pay at the rate of one
week's pay for each year of employment by the employee
in that establishment.
The severance pay to eligible
employees shall be in addition to any final wage
payment to the employee and shall be paid within one
regular pay period after the employee's last full day
of work, notwithstanding any other provisions of law.
"3.
Mitigation of Severance Pay Liability.
There
shall be no liability for severance pay to an eligible
individual if:
A.
Relocation
or
termination
of
a
covered
establishment is necessitated by a physical calamity;
B.
The employee is covered by an express contract
providing for severance pay;
C.
That employee accepts employment at the new
location; or
D.
That employee has been employed by the employer
for less than three years."

never

- 3 -

resumed operations
amendments,

June

before
2,

the

expiration date

1984.

Prior

to

the

of

the

proposed

signing

of

the

amendments, employees of the plant, appees in this action, filed
suit against appnt, seeking severance pay pursuant to §625-B.

--------------.

A

few days later, appee, Director of the Bureau of Labor Standards,
also

commenced

severance

pay

an

action

law

as

to

to

enforce

all

of

the

provisions

appnt's

employees.

of

Maine

After

a

consolidated trial, the trial justice found that appnt was liable
for severence pay .

With respect to the issues relevant here, the

Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.
The ~ne Sup. Jud.
it was not

1a

e

for

first rejected appnt's argument that
severance pay under

statute is preempted by ERISA.

§625-B because that

The court first noted that ERISA

.
. . \\ t h at prov1. d es:
con t a1ns
an J;l
express preemp t.1on prov1s1on
"Except as provided in subsection (6) of this
section, the prov1s1ons of this title and title IV
shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they
may~ reafter relate to any employee benefit
plan described in §1003(a) of this title."
29 u.s.c.
§1144.

u.s.

In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463
that

§1144

matters

not

only

covered

by

preempts
ERISA,

state

but

85

(1983), the Court

law governing

also

state

law

the

held

subject

that

has

"a

connection with or reference to" employee benefit plans covered
by the statute.

Id.,

at 97-98.

-·-

Because Maine's severance pay

- ----

law does not attempt to regulate the reporting, disclosure, and
fiduciary

subjects

covered

by

ERISA,

the

statute

will

be

preempted only if it can be said to have "a connection with or
reference

to"

employee

coverage.

The

Maine

~-

benefit

severance

plans
pay

that
statute

are

within ERISA' s

does

not

affect

- 4 -

employee benefit plans that are within ERISA's regulatory reach.
It

is

clear

employee

under

benefit

u.s.c.

29

plans

§§1003(a)

intended

for

and

1002(1)

coverage

that

the

under

ERISA are

those created by employers or employee organizations.

Thus, the

preemptive effect of §1144 is on those state laws that affect
plans created by either of these private parties.

The severance

pay

benefit.

liability

here

is

a

state-created

fringe

In

addition, §625-B (b) (B) totally eliminates state regulation if a
plan covering severance pay is created by an employer or employee
organization.

Because

Maine's

severance

pay

statute

is

operative only when a privately created employee benefit plan
covering severance pay is not in existence, it does not have a
"connection

with

or

reference

to"

an

employee

benefit

plan

covered by ERISA.
The Maine Sup. Jud. Ct. next rejected appnt' s argument that
§625-B is preempted by the NLRA.

Appnt had argued that, because

the Maine severance pay statute mandates the substantive terms of
its collective bargaining agreement, the statute is preempted.
The court disagreed,

noting that this Court has discerned two

different principles of preemption that flow from the NLRA.

The

first principle is based on implied congressional intent to leave
certain
either

conduct
§7 or

regulation

that

§8 of

by

either

seemingly broad

is

neither

protected

nor

prohibited

by

the NLRA unrestricted from most forms of
the

range of

NLRB
this

or

the

branch of

States.

Despite

the

the NLRA preempt ion,

state laws of general application that impose minimal substantive
requirements

on

contract

terms

are

not

preempted.

See

- 5 Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S.Ct. 2380
(1985).

Maine's

severance

pay

law

is

a

statute

of

general

application that affects union and nonunion employees equally.
The

statute

bargaining

has
process

parties have
pay.

a

very

limited

because

it

impact

does

not

§625-B

does

affect

the

relationship by encouraging employers
of

section,

the

ever

collective

apply

when

the

reached an agreement on the subject of severance

Although

form

on

severance

pay

contract

collective

to either

or

face

bargaining

agree

liability

to some

under

the

it does not limit the rights of self organization or

forms of collective bargaining protected by the NLRA.

The second

line of preemption that can be discerned from Sup. Ct.

cases

protects the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB to determine what
kind of conduct is either prohibited or protected by the NLRA.

u.s.

San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359

236 (1959).

State statutes that have been held to be preempted under Garmon
involve state action that attempts to regulate conduct directly
that is protected under §7 of the NLRA or prohibited under §8 of
the

Act.

regulates

Appnt

contended

conduct

protected

that
by

the

Maine

the

NLRB

severance
by

(1)

pay

imposing

law
a

different resolution to a bargaining impasse that is required by
§8(d) of the NLRA and (2)

interfering with the employer's right

under

to

§7

of

unilaterally.
may

not

NLRA

implement

its

last

best

offer

This argument, however, merely asserts that Maine

employ

application
process.

the

that

its
has

police
an

power

effect

on

to

enact

the

a

law

collective

of

general

bargaining

This does not even implicate Garmon-type preemption.

- 6 -

Moreover, even if §625-B does interfere with the jurisdiction of
the NLRB, the statute would be saved from preemption under Farmer
v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 430
U.S.

2 90

(1977) ,

interest

in

because

it

protecting

reflects

Maine

the State's

citizens

from

substantial

the

economic

}

accom~es

dislocation that
3.
that

CONTENTIONS:

severance

within

the

pay

ERISA preemption:
plans

definition

§1002 (1) (B).

large-scale plant closings.

are
of

employee

that

term

Appnt first observes
welfare
in

benefit

ERISA,

29

plans
U.S.C.

The Maine severance pay statute requires that an
The statute provides the

employer have a severance pay plan.
employer with two options:

(1)

conditions

or

of

that

plan

accepting the statutory terms and
(2)

selecting

other

terms

and

conditions.

Either option results in the creation of a severance

pay

Since

plan.

the

very

operation

of

§625-B

requires

an

employer to establish a plan, the statute has "connection with or
reference to" an employee benefit plan and is preempted by ERISA.
Shaw,

supra,

463

u.s., at 96-97.

The Maine Sup.

Jud.

Ct.'s

decision is in conflict with that of the CA9 in Standard Oil Co.
of California v. Agsalud, 633 F.2d 760
4 54 U.S. 801

( 1981) •

(CA9 1980), aff'd mem.,

In Standard Oil, the plaintiff challenged

the state law requiring employers to provide a comprehensive prepaid health plan to their employees.

The State of Hawaii argued

that the terms "employee benefit plan" in ERISA did not encompass
plans mandated by state law.

The CA9 rejected this argument.

The Agsalud decision finds its support in the plain language of
ERISA.

Section 1003 (b) (3)

exempts from ERISA coverage a "plan

- 7 maintained
applicable

solely

workmen's

compensation

[laws]

for

the

purpose

compensation
or

of

laws

complying

or

[ii]

with

[i]

unemployment

[iii] disability insurance laws."

These

are the only exemptions for state-mandated employee benefits.

If

Congress had intended the sweeping exemption found by the Maine
court,

the

specific

exemptions

in

§1003(b) (3)

would

be

superfluous.
Appees
preempted

argue
under

that

ERISA

the

Maine

because

severance

(1)

the

law

pay
is

law

not

is

a

not

private

employee benefit plan established by an employer or union, and
(2)

the law does not create an ongoing program of benefits but

instead

imposes

shutdown.

The

a one-time obligation
theory

anomalous results.

advanced

by

in the event of a plant

appnt

would

lead

to highly

If, as appnt suggests, the severance pay law

must be deemed to require employers to maintain an ERISA covered
plan,

then

it would

be

preempted

even with

respect

to

those

employers who have no pens ion plan or employee benefit plan of
any

kind.

therefore

Thus,
not

nevertheless

an

employer

subject

be able

to

that

has

no

regulation

ERISA plan

under

and

ERISA

would

to take advantage of ERISA preemption to

escape its obligations under the Maine severance pay law.
CA9 's decision

is

in Agsalud

is distinguishable

for

two

The

reasons.

First, the Hawaii statute at issue in Agsalud required employers
to

establish

an

ongoing

benefit

program.

Second,

the

Hawaii

statute imposed certain specific additional requirements on the
employer's existing ERISA plan.

In the case at bar, however, the

Maine severance pay law does not in any way alter the rights or

- 8 obligations of appnt under its existing pension plan.
In its brief

in opposition to appees motion to dismiss or

affirm, appnt refutes appees attempt to distinguish Agsalid.
held

in Holland

v.

Burlington Industries,

Inc.,

As

772 F.2d 1140

(CA4 1985), aff'd mem. sub nom. Brooks v. Burlington Industries,

s.

Inc., 106
Inc.,

765

(1986) ,

Ct.

F.2d

(1986), and Gilbert v. Burlington Industries,
320

severence

(CA2

1985),

pay plans

aff'd

mem.,

are ERISA plans,

typically involve one-time, lump-sum

s.

106

Ct.

3267

even though they

payments.

The United States Chamber of Commerce, as amicus curiae, has
submitted a brief in support of appnt.
submits

that

conflict

the

with

decision

the

of

decisions

the
in

The Chamber of Commerce

Maine

Sup.

Holland,

Jud.

supra,

Ct.

and

is

in

Gilbert,

supra.
NLRA preemption:
mandatory

subject of

Polishing Co.,
provides

Appnt maintains

that

bargaining.

350 F. 2d 191
a

bargaining

construing §8 (d) ,
employers

and

atmosphere.

Royal Plating

Nevertheless, the NLRA

"obligation does
See §8(d), 29

not

compel

u.s.c.

either

§l58(d}.

to

e.g.,

negotiate
Lodge 76,

in

a

generally

(1976)

process.

0

In

unregulated

International Association of

Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 427
132

&

this Court has stated that Congress intended

unions

See,

See NLRB v.

(CA3 1965).

party to agree to a proposal."
__/""

that severance pay is a

The

Moreover,

Maine

statute

intrudes

on

the

u.s.

bargaining

'---------------~-----------------------

the Maine statute sets up a standard that

non-union employers can avoid easily and that unions can bargain
away

if

they

extract

a

satisfactory guid

pro guo.

The Maine

....

-

9 -

statute interferes in an area where the States maintain little,
if any, regulatory authority.
Appees
foreclosed

respond that appnt' s NLRA preemption argument is

by

the

decision

in Metropolitan Life,

supra.

The

Maine severance pay law merely requires that individual workers
be given a specific benefit under certain circumstances.
result,

it

falls

within

the

category

of

state

As a

legislation

establishing "minimum labor standards" as that term is used in
Metropolitan Life.
regulate or
Congress

less

interfere with

has

preempted.

Since the Maine severance pay law does not

left

to

any of

employers

the
and

economic weapons
employees,

it

is

that
not

In fact, the Maine severance pay law is significantly

intrusive

than

the

Massachusetts

mandatory

benefit

law

upheld in Metropolitan Life because it preserves the freedom of
employers and employees to contract on the subject of severance
pay.
In

reply,

preemption

is

appant

governed

Metropolitan Life.
and

concedes

Metropolitan

by

t ~ the

the

dispute

over

---

proper

interpretation

NLRA
of

The fundamental distinction between this case
Life

is

that

ish a minimum standard.

the

Maine

statute

does

not

Maine employers may contract to
benefit provided by the statute.

The Chamber of Commerce essentially repeats the arguments of
appnt.

.
/

----........._

')

4 (' ,orscu~
ERIS-A-

Preemption: This Court's decision in Shaw, supra, does

not provide a def ini ti ve answer to the issue here because Shaw

- 10 -

~

concerned state law requirements governing employee benefit plans
established by employers. The decisions in Holland, supra,
Gilbert,

supra, concerned severance pay provisions

and~

in employee

handbooks prepared by the employer in both cases.

Because the

a state statutory reguirement, these cases do not conflict with

---

-

decision

below.

...

the

...,..-_- -

The

CA9's

decision

in

Agsalid,

supra,

~------·-·

however, presents a closer question. Appee correctly notes that
the prepaid health care plans required by Hawaii law in Agsalid
were ongoing plans that supplemented health care plans governed
by ERISA.

Despite these differences with the case at hand, the

CA9's rejection of the argument that the term "employee benefit
plans"

under ERISA does

not encompass

requirements

imposed by

state law does conflict with the Maine Sup. Jud. Ct.'s treatment
of the same argument.

Because this issue is likely to arise in

other. . contex-~nary review may be warranted.
f NLRA

Maine

Preemption ~

The preemptive effect of the NLRA on the

~tatute her ;:;~~nder

Metropolitan

Life,

this

Court

Metropolitan Life, supra.

In

stated

no

that

"there

is

suggestion in the legislative history of the NLRA that Congress
intended to disturb the myriad of state laws then in existence
that set minimum labor standards, but were unrelated in any way
to the processes of bargaining or self-organization."
at

2398.

At

appears

to

outside

the

first

fall

glance,

the

Maine

~~of

preemptive

scope
. ,•

of

the

severance

"minimum
NLRA.

105 S.Ct.,
pay

labor

statute

standards"

Nevertheless,

the

Metropolitan Life Court described a "minimum labor standard" as a

,.

I

- 11 requirement

that

equally,"

{1)

affects

neither

{ 2)

"union

and

encourages

nonunion

nor

employees

discourages

the

"collective-bargaining processes," and {3) is "independent of the
collective-bargaining

process."

Id.,

at

Because

2397.

the

severance pay provision in the Maine statute is not applicable if
an

employee

is

covered

by

an

express

contract

providing

for

severance pay, a union can use the statutory requirement as a
bargaining chip

in contract

negotiations

to exact concessions

As such, appn t may be correct in asserting

from an employer.

that the Maine statute is not sufficiently independent of the
collective

bargaining

process

to

constitute

a

labor

standard

outside the reach of the NLRA. Moreover, as appnt argues, the
Maine statute does not establish a minimum standard because the
statutory

standard

preemption question

may
is

be

lowered

by

contract.

therefore suff icently close

The

NLRA

to counsel

against summary action.

I recommend noting probable jurisdiction.

There

is

a

motion

to

dismiss

or

affirm,

a

brief

in

a

opposition to the motion to dismiss or affirm, and a brief by the
United States Chamber of Commerce as amicus curiae.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
To:

Justice Powell

From:

Ronald

February 17, 1987

No. 86-341, Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne
Appeal from Maine Supreme Court
Set for oral argument Tuesday March 24 (2d case)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED:
ployers,

Whether a Maine statute that requires em-

in the absence of an express contract to the contrary,

to pay severance pay upon plant closings, is preempted by ERISA
~

or by the NLRA.

I.

2.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

26 Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. §625-B is the Maine Plant ClosIt applies to any employer who closes, or moves more

ing Law.

than 100 miles, an establishment that employs more than 100 workers.

The statute requires such employers to pay severance pay at

the rate

of

one week's pay for

statute does not apply if the

each year

e~yee

contract providing for severance pay."

"is

of employment.
~ve_:ed

The

by an e,2{press

§625-B(3} (B).

Appt Fort Halifax Packing operated a covered establishment in Winslow, Maine.

It closed the factory on May 23, 1981,

but did not pay severance pay.
of

------------

In November, 1981, appee Director
Standards

---the

Maine Bureau of Labor

(the State}

seeking to force appt to pay severance pay

sued appt

under the statute.

Appt contended that the severance pay law is preempted by
and the NLRA.

Both the trial court and the Maine Supreme Court

held appt 1 iable.
pr~empted

by

ERIS~

~SA

Maine set concluded that the statute was ,not ~. <)( G (
because _ERISA regulates only privately created

employee benefit plans; it does not apply to state-created obligations like the severance pay statute.

Maine set thought the

NLRA claim was controlled by Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 u.s. 724 (1985}.

In that case, the Court held

that the NLRA does not preempt state laws that merely mandate
minimum employee benefits.

The Maine SCT concluded that the sev-

erance pay law was such a law.
Fort Halifax filed a jurisdictional statement.
ed to note except for JUSTICES BLACKMUN
requested an amicus brief from the SG.

&

STEVENS.

All votThe Court

3•

II.

ERISA PREEMPTION

Section 514(a) of ERISA preempts "any and all State laws

--=-

~

insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."

u.s. c.

29

§1144(a).

The Court has described this as

a "virtually unique pre-emption provision."
v.

Construction Laborers vacation Trust,

(1983).

It is

clear

that

u.s.

a

particular

See Shaw v.

85, 98-100 (1983).

ed the provision broadly.
state law

u.s.

463

1, 24,

Congress intended the

provision to be extremely broad.
Inc., 463

Franchise Tax Board

Thus, the

n. 26

sweep of this

Delta Air Lines,

C~ et

It has not yet rejected any claim that
"relates

within the meaning of §514(a).

to"

an

employee

Accordingly,

benefit

plan

the usual presump-

tions against preemption seem inapplicable in this case; rather,

.----.....,.
intent, as summarized in Shaw, suggests a presumption

Congress'
in

~ ion

of any statute that would hinder the uni-

formity Congress sought to establish.
The term "employee benefit plan" includes the term "employee welfare

benefit

plan,"

which

is

defined as

"any

plan,

fund, or program which ••• is ••• established or maintained by an
employer ••• to the extent that such plan, fund,

or program was

established or is maintained for the purpose of providing [a number of listed benefits, including] any benefit described in section

186(c)

§186(c)
erance

of

this

title."

29

u.s.c.

§1002(1).

29

u.s.c.

includes "money ••• paid ••• for the purpose of ••• sev-

. ..

benefits.

tion that a

--

n

§186 (c) (6).
II

Thus,

there can be no ques\ '-

plan providing severance benefits would be a plan
.-----..
covered by ERISA.
See, e.g., Holland v. Burlington Industries,

~
.

~

4.

Inc., 77 2 F. 2d 1140, 1144-1146

s.

aff'd mem., No. 85-944, 106
1.
E

(per Wilkinson,

J.) ,

Ct. 3267 (1986).

Does the Maine statute create an ERISA plan?--The

q ~est.!_Y!i}in

icul t

k

( CA4 1985)

employer ~~Y

this case is whether a statute requiring

certain em lo

~ s,

ers to contract out of the obligation,

but allowing employ-

"relates _ to"

~y

"plan"

within the meaning of ERISA.
In this case, appt had no formal
--~
-benefit plan in the normal sense. But appt's principal point is

----

that passage of the state statute requiring appt to pay benefits
created a plan within the meaning of ERISA.

This argument has

1k

two difficulties.
First, such a plan is established by the
private

employer.

§514(a)

only

maintained by an employer."

covers

u.s. C.

29

plans

to say that the employer
payments.

In a

"maintains" a
CA9

or

Although this

I am not persuaded. ~~~

this obligation,

similar context,

"established

§1002 ( 1) •

was the basis of the Maine S Ct's decision,

Mai~stablished"

not by a

~t

-

it seems fair rk ")

program for making the

concluded:

"Congress did

distinguish between plans established or maintained by private
employers for
tained

by

private employees and plans established or main-

government entities

government plans are exempt.
Oil of California v.
mem. 454

u.s.

the statute.
guishable,
reasons.

Agsalud,

801 (1981).

for

government

employees.

Private plans are not."

--------------

633

F.2d 760,

762

Such

Standard

(1980),

aff'd

-

I think this is a credible reading of

Moreover, although the facts of Agsalud are distin-

its

reasoning

~

~

all,

is entitled to

~urt
t\~

consideration for

summarily affirmed it.

two

~

5.

Congress specifically reversed other parts of this decision.
the SG notes,

As

this legislative response suggests that Congress

agreed with the relevant portions of the decision.

Accordingly,

I would find that the State's involvement in this case does not
preclude

the

employer's

obligation

to

pay

severance

pay

from

being a "plan ••• maintained by an employer."
The second point is more difficult.
mand to the

The statute's com-

employer has certainly not created the cumbersome

bureaucratic organization that is the typical ERISA plan.
argues that
plan.

the employer's obligation to pay

Maine

is not an ERISA

Although I think this is a good argument, I am inclined to
The statute

disagree.

extends to any

"plan,

fund,

or program

which is established ••• for the purpose of providing
benefits]."

29

u.s.c.

§1002(1).

[covered

"Program" seems to be a vague

word that could be extended to cover informal obligations like
This view

this.

is bolstered by

the leading precedent on the

definition of "plan," Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367 (CAll
1985)

~ ;e~dbold~J.).

Surprisingly, all of the par-

ties suggest that the Donovan analysis should be applied here.
That case established a four-part test for whether less formal
arrangements had reached the status of a "program" under ERISA.
"A

court must

stances
benefits,

a

determine

reasonable
[ 2]

whether

person

benef ici aries,

from

the

sur rounding

could ascertain
[ 3]

procedures for receiving benefits."

source of

the

[1]

financing,

688 F.2d, at 1373.

circumintended
and

[ 4]

Applica-

tion of this test to the Maine statute strongly suggests that the
aine statute creates a plan

The statute clearly describes the

6.

benefits--severance pay calculated at 1 week's salary per year of
employment.

The beneficiaries are employees who lose their jobs

because of the closing or relocation of a covered establishment.
The payments are financed from the employer's general funds.

The

benefits can be recovered either by an independent lawsuit or
proceedings brought by the Maine Bureau of Labor Standards.
An independent provision of the statute also provides a
strong indication that payments mandated by state laws like this
are plans preempted by §514 (a) •

§ 4 (b) ( 3)

of ERISA, 29 U.s. c.

§1003(b) (3) preserves from preemption any plan "maintained solely
for the purpose of complying with applicable workmen's compensation laws or unemployment compensation or disability insurance
laws."

If compliance with a state law requiring employee bene-

fits did not create a "plan" within the scope of §514(a), Congress would have had no need to preserve some of those 1 aws in
§4(b) (3).

[I address later appee's contention that this section

preserves Maine's severance pay statute.

See infra, at 8-9.)

The final point in appt's favor is this Court's previous
interpretation of §514(a).

In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463

u.s. 85 ( 1983), the Court considered a state 1 aw that mandated
payment of certain disability benefits.

After quoting some broad

dictionary definitions of the word "relate," the Court concluded
that "the Disability Benefits Law, which requires employers to
pay employees specific benefits, clearly 'relate[s) to'
plans."

Id., at 97.

benefit

Although the parties do not rely on this

statement, it seems rather closely on point.

7.

There
State's

side.

are

relatively

strong

The provision of

pol icy

arguments

on

the

minimum employee benefits is

squarely within traditional state powers.

It seems quite strange

for Congress to preempt the State's ability to require payment of
such benefits.

Moreover,

the language of

ERISA preempts only

"employee benefit plans," not "employee benefits."

Although appt

argues persuasively that this law can be construed to create a
plan,

the full

preepts all

import

of

his argument

is that ERISA in fact

state employee benefit laws.

conclusion, that I am reluctant to accept. /
But I

This is a troubling
~

doubt that this discomfort should overcome the

-------

broad preemptive force of §514(a).

- ------------

sweep very broadly.

Congress clearly intended to

It specifically included several exceptions

to preemption for areas where it thought traditional State regulation was particularly important.

See §514 (b) (2) (A)

(the insur-

ance saving clause at issue in No. 85-1043, Pilot Life (argued in
January);

§4 (b) ( 3)

(preserving unemployment compensation, work-

men's compensation, and disability insurance laws).

It did not

include a saving clause for this statute, perhaps because severance statutes did not occur to it while it was drafting the saving clauses.

~ I conclude that the effect of the Maine statute ~-

~J

is to create a plan, and thus that the statute is within the m;;,eemptive field of §514(a).
2.

Does ERISA preempt the Maine statute because of its

effect on traditional plans.--Even if you disagree with this conclusion, you could find that the statute is preempted because of

1 1
al-wnu.L

~a..i-G-t-

8.

its effects on more traditional plans.

Two points are relevant.

First, the statute encourages employers to enter contracts about
employee benefits,

so they can (i)

insert a provision providing

lower severance benefits than the Maine statute, and (ii)
the full

force

ERISA plans,

of

the

Maine

the SG argues,

statute.

This

incentive

conflicts with ERISA.

avoid

to form

Congress did

-------

not intend to force employers to provide any benefits in particu--------~~~------~------_;------------~
1 ar; it intended only that they provide them fairly.
Although
this argument has some force,

I am not overwhelmed.

Generally,

you might think that when Congress legislates merely to prevent
unfairness in particular transactions, it does not intend to prevent the states from encouraging, or discouraging, those transactions.

Cf.

Edgar v.

MITE Corp.,

(your concurring opinion).
broad preemption
lates"

457

U.S.

624,

646-647

But in this case Congress has used a

provision to preempt any

state law .that

This Court has concluded that

to plans.

(1982)

"re-

"relates" in-

eludes the meanings "pertain" and "bring into assocation with or
connection with."
16 (1983).

Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463

u.s.

85, 97, n.

Using this broad interpretation of "relate," I think__

the SG's argument has some merit.
Second,

the

SG

posits

a

multi-state

ERISA plan does not mention severance pay.
Maine employees severance pay.
ity in plan benefits,

Congress

whose

But he must pay his

Accordingly, to maintain uniform-

he must amend his plan to deal with the

requirements of Maine law.
fling,

employer,

thought

Although this problem might seem tri-

ERISA would

end such

problems.

Under

ERISA, multistate employers who draft plans complying with ERISA

9.

should be able to pay all their employees the benefits provided
by the plans, and not be required to make individual assessments
of

rights

under various

state 1 aws.

The interference of the

Maine statute with ERISA in such a case is indisputable.

The

problem with this argument is that §514(a) does not preempt all
State laws that relate to plans; rather, it preempts State laws
only "insofar as they ••• relate" to plans.

The case before the

Court involves an employer who did not have an ERISA plan, and
did not have to deal with the law.

Thus, this problem did not

eventuate in this case, and is thus arguably irrelevant.
I think these points are marginal.

Even if you believe

the statute itself does not create a "plan," you could find that
its incentive to create plans and its interference with preexisting plans suggest that it should be covered by §514(a).

This

would be a close question, however.
3.

Is the Maine Statute saved by the unemployment com- ~

pensation saving
statute

is

clause?--The State

within

the

coverage

of

argues that,

even if

§514(a),

is

it

§4(b) (3) 's reference to "unemployment compensation
laws.

n

I

saved

the
by

insurance

agree with the SG that this argument is meritless.

First, §4 protects plans maintained solely for the specified purposes.

Although one of the goals of severance pay is to ease the

rigors of unemployment, unemployment is not a necessary condition
of

receiving benefits.

Because employees can receive benefits

even when they are employed, it is hard to see how the statute is
designed "solely" to redress the pain of unemployment.

10.

Second,

ERISA appears to preserve plans maintained to

comply only with "unemployment compensation ••• insurance laws."
Although the statute might deal with "unemployment compensation,"
it is impossible to characterize the statute as an "insurance"
law.

I agree with the SG that Congress clearly was referring to

statutes like the federal FICA program, that operate like (poorly
managed)
all.

insurance funds,

In this case,

spreading the risk of unemployment to

there is no risk-spreading whatsoever,

but

simply payments by the responsible employer to the injured employees.

***
Thus, I recommend that you vote to reverse the Maine set
on the ground that
ERISA,

29 u.s.c.

compensation

( i)

the statute is preempted by §514 (a)

§1144(a), and

(ii)

of

it is not an "unemployment

insurance law" protected by §4(b) (3), 29 u.s.c.

§1003 (b) {3).
III.

NLRA PREEMPTION

I agree with the SG that the NLRA argument is very weak;
I will not burden you with lengthy discussion.
Life Ins.

Co.

v.

Massachusetts,

In Metropolitan

470 u.s. 724 (1985), the Court

found that the NLRA did not preempt a state statute requiring the
inclusion of certain health benefits in employee health insurance
policies.

"Minimum state labor standards affect union and non-

union employees equally, and neither encourage nor discourage the
collective-bargaining

processes

NLRA."

In all relevant respects, this case is in-

Id., at 755.

distinguishable.

The statute

that

are

the

subject

of

the

reflects the Maine legislature's

11.

conclusion that all
severance pay.

employees should be provided this floor of

This is not so big a bargaining chip that it will

give unions an unfair edge at the bargaining table.

Indeed, be-

cause Maine allows unions to bargain away the severance pay provided by the statute, unions gain almost no bargaining power from
the statute.

In sum,

significant

effect

labor policy.

I see nothing in this statute that has a

on,

much

less

conflicts with,

the

federal

I recommend affirmance on this point.
IV.

CONCLUSION

I recommend that you find the Maine severance pay statute preempted by ERISA.
1.

The statute

requires employers to pay

types of employee benefits that
exclusively

by

ERISA.

This

in

Congres~

itself

one of

the

intended to be governed
arguably

conflicts with

__

Congress' desire to leave employers free to pay whatever
benefits
---...__
they wished in this area# .- Moreover,
~~

it encourages employers to

draft plans to avoid the statute, and hinders uniformity in the
administration of preexisting plans.
late to" plans covered by ERISA.
other

I think these effects "re-

Of course, the argument on the

side is considerable; you may hesitate before concluding

that Congress intended to preempt such a statute.

--

But the broad

language of §514, coupled with this Court's past broad interpre'

tation of that language, suggest that the Maine statute is preempted.
2.
unemployment

I would reject appee' s contention that this is an
compensation

insurance

1 aw

covered

by

29

u.s. C.

12.

§1003(b) (3).

Whatever this law is, it is not an insurance law of

any kind.

~.

I would reject appee' s contention that this law is

preempted by the NLRA.
I recommend that you vote to reverse the Maine Supreme
Court.
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No. 86-341, Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne
1.
29

u.s.c.

that

Severance benefits clearly are covered by ERISA.
§1002(1) (incorporating by reference 29

includes

"severance

Industries, Inc., 772 F.

benefits");

u.s.c.

Holland v.

2d 1140, 1144-1146 (CA4 1985)

See

S186(c),

Burlington
(per Wil-

kinson, J.), aff'd mem., No. 85-944, 106 S. Ct. 3267 (1986).
2.
is

The fact that the State has required this arrangement

irrelevant.

S514(a)

tained by an employer."

covers all

plans

"established or main-

This excludes only plans established "by

government entities for government employees."
decision.

Appt

concedes

this would be a

See CA9's Agsalud

plan if

tained in an agreement negotiated between the
union.

it were

con-

employer and the

The result should be no different because the government

mandates the

result.

As we said in Shaw,

a

statute "which re-

quires employers to pay employees specific benefits, clearly 'relate[s] to' benefit plans."
3.
law.

This

is

not

an

unemployment

compensation

insurance

When Congress exempted unemployment compensation insurance

lawsfrompreemption,itwasreferringtoSocialSecurityand
other similar programs .
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JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

May 5, 1987

Re:

86-341 - Ft. Halifax Packing v. Coyne

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

May 5, 1987

Re:

86-341

Fort Halifax Packing Company v. Coyne, et al.

Dear Bill,
I will wait for the dissent.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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Re:
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Justice Powell
Ronald
No. 86-341, Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne
In this case, you changed your vote at Conference to agree

with JUSTICE STEVENS's position,

that would support affirmance.

JUSTICE BRENNAN's opinion for this result is in.

Although all is

not clear from your Conference notes, I do not think that JUSTICE
BRENNAN's

opinion

follows

the

rationale

you

accepted.

event, I do not find his opinion particularly persuasive.
talk

to you about

wish,

I

note

writing.

in detail

at your

convenience.

any

I can
If you

can give a detailed discussion of my disagreements with

the opinion.
a

this

In

saying

Myfl

current recommendation,

that

for

the

time

being

though,
you will

is to send him
await

further

This will preserve all your options and allow us to see

what others have in mind.

~u:prttttt <!fo-nd of

tl{t 'Jnittb ~tdt.e
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA

May 6, 1987

Re:

No. 86-341 - Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne

Dear Bill:
I will await the dissent in this case.
Sincerely,

~
Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 86-341

FORT HALIFAX PACKING COMPANY, INC., APPELLANT v. P. DANIEL COYNE, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
LABOR STANDARDS OF MAINE, ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MAINE
[May - , 1987]

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we must decide whether a Maine statute requiring employers to provide a one-time severance payment
to employees in the event of a plant closing, 26 M.R.S.A.
§ 625-B (1986 Supp.), 1 is preempted by either the Employee
' The statute provides in pertinent part:
"2. Severance pay. Any employer who relocates or terminates a covered
establishment shall be liable to his employees for severance pay at the rate
of one week's pay for each year of employment by the employee in that
establishment. The severance pay to eligible employees shall be in addition to any final wage payment to the employee and shall be paid within one
regular pay period after the employee's last full day of work, notwithstanding any other provision of law.
3. Mitigation of severance pay liability. There shall be no liability for severance pay to an eligible employee if:
A. Relocation or termination of a covered establishment is necessitated by
a physical calamity;
B. The employee is covered by an express contract providing for severance pay;
C. That employee accepts employment at the new location; or
D. That employee has been employed by the employer for less than 3
years."
§ 625-B(1)(A) defines "covered establishment" as a facility that employs
100 or more persons, while § 625-B(l)(F) defines "relocation" as the removal of all or substantially all operations at least 100 miles away from
their original location.

86-341-0PINION
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FORT HALIFAX PACKING CO. v. COYNE

Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 1001-1381
(ERISA), or the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C.
§§ 157-158 (NLRA). The statute was upheld by the Maine
Superior Court, Civ. Action No. CV81-516 (Oct. 29, 1982),
and by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, 510 A. 2d 1054
(1986). We granted certioriari, - - U. S. - - (1986), and
now affirm.
I
In 1972, Fort Halifax Packing Company (Fort Halifax or
Company) purchased a poultry packaging and processing
plant that had operated in Winslow, Maine for almost two
decades. The Company continued to operate the plant for
almost another decade, until, on May 23, 1981, it discontinued operations at the plant and laid off all its employees except several maintenance and clerical workers. At the time
of closing, over 100 employees were on the payroll. Fortyfive had worked in the plant for over 10 years, 19 for over 20
years, and two for 29 years. Plaintiff's Supplementary Response to Employee List, Exhibit A (June 3, 1983). Following the closing, the Company met with State officials and
with representatives of Local 385 of the Amalgamated Meat
Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, which represented many of the employees who had worked in the plant.
While Fort Halifax initially suggested that reopening the
plant might be feasible if the union agreed to certain concessions in the form of amendments to the collective bargaining
agreement, ultimately the Company decided against resuming operations and to close the plant.
On October 30, 1981, eleven employees filed suit in Superior Court seeking severance pay pursuant to 26 M.R.S.A.
§ 625-B (1986 Supp.). This statute, note 1, supra, provides
that any employer that terminates operations at a plant with
100 or more employees, or relocates those operations more
than 100 miles away, must provide one week's pay for each
year of employment to all employees who have worked in the
plant at least three years. The employer has no such liabil-
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ity if the employee accepts employment at the new location,
or if the employee is covered by a contract that deals with the
issue of severance pay. I d., at § 625-B(2)-(3). Under authority granted by the statute, the Maine Director of the Bureau of Labor Standards also commenced an action to enforce
the provisions of the state law, which action superceded the
suit filed by the employees. 2
The Superior Court, ruling on cross-motions for summary
judgment, granted the Director's motion, holding that Fort
Halifax is liable for severance pay under the statute. Civ.
Action No. CV81-516 (Oct. 29, 1982). The Maine Supreme
Judicial Court affirmed. 510 A. 2d 1054 (1986). The court
rejected the Company's contention that the plant-closing
statute was preempted by ERISA, holding that ERISA preempted only benefit plans created by employers or employee
organizations. I d., at 1059. It observed that the severance
pay liability in this case results from the operation of the
state statute, rather than from the operation of an employercreated benefit plan. Ibid. Therefore, reasoned the court,
"[i]nasmuch as § 625-B does not implicate a plan created by
an employer or employee organization, it cannot be said to be
preempted by ERISA." Ibid. The court also rejected the
argument that the state provision was preempted by the
NLRA because it regulated conduct covered by either §§ 7 or
8 of that statute. It found that the Maine statute applies
equally to union and nonunion employees, and reflects "the
state's substantial interest in protecting Maine citizens from
2

Section 625-B(5) of the Maine statute provides in relevant part:
"5. Suits by the director. The director is authorized to supervise the payment of the unpaid severance pay owing to any employee under this section. The director may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the amount of any unpaid severance pay. The right
provided by subsection 4 to bring an action by or on behalf of any employee, and of any employee to become a party plaintiff to any such action,
shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by the director in an action
under this subsection, unless the action is dismissed without prejudice by
the director . . . "
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the economic dislocation that accompanies large-scale plant
closings." I d., at 1062. As a result, the court found that
eligible employees were entitled to severance pay due to the
closure of the plant at Winslow. 3
We hold that the Maine statute is not preempted by
ERISA, not for the reason offered by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, but because the statute neither establishes, nor
requires an employer to maintain, an employee welfare benefit "plan" under that federal statute. 4 We hold further that
the Maine law is not preempted by the NLRA, since it establishes a minimum labor standard that does not intrude upon
the collective bargaining process. As a result, we affirm the
judgment of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court that the
Maine statute is not preempted by either ERISA or the
NLRA.
II
Appellant's basic argument is that any state law p~rtaining
to a type of employee benefit listed in ERISA necessarily
regulates an employee benefit plan, and therefore must be
preempted. Because severance benefits are included in
ERISA, see 29 U. S. C. § 1002(1)(B), appellant argues that
ERISA preempts the Maine statute. 5 In effect, appellant
Ninety-three employees of the plant are eligible for lump-sum payments ranging from $490 to $11,500. The total amount due is about
$256,600. Affidavit of Xavier J. Dietrich, Exhibit A (August 13, 1984).
• Because we hold that the obligation created by the Maine statute does
not involve a plan, we do not address the State's alternative argument
that, even if the law does establish a plan, it is not preempted by virtue of
the exemption for plans "maintained solely for the purpose of complying
with applicable ... unemployment compensation laws." 29 U. S. C.
§ 1003(b)(3).
5
Section 1002(1)(B) defines an employee welfare benefit plan as a plan
that pays, inter alia, benefits described in 29 U. S. C. ~ 186(c). The latter
section includes, inter alia, money paid by an employer to a trust fund to
pay for severance benefits. Section 1002(1)(B) has been construed to include severance benefits paid out of general assets, as well as out of a trust
fund. See Holland v. Burlington Industries, 772 F. 2d 1140 (CA4 1985),
aff'd mem.,- U. S . - (1986); Gilbert v. Burlington Industries, 765
3

..
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argues that ERISA forecloses virtually all state legislation
regarding employee benefits. This contention fails, however, in light of the plain language of ERISA's preemption
provision, the underlying purpose of that provision, and the
overall objectives of ERISA itself.
A
The first answer to appellant's argument is found in the express language of the statute. ERISA's preemption provision does not refer to state laws relating to "employee benefits", but to state laws relating to "employee benefit plans":
"the provisions of this subchapter . . . shall supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in
§ 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under § 1003(b) of
this title." 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a) (emphasis added).

We have held that the words "relate to" should be construed
expansively: "[a] law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in
the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or
reference to such a plan." Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U. S.
85, 97 (1983). Nothing in our case law, however, supports
appellant's position that the word "plan" should in effect be
read out of the statute. Indeed, Shaw itself speaks of a state
law's connection with or reference to a plan. Ibid. The
words "benefit" and "plan" are used separately throughout
ERISA, and nowhere in the statute are they treated as the
equivalent of one another. Given the basic difference between a "benefit" and a "plan," Congress' choice of language
is significant in its preemption of only the latter.
Thus, as a first matter, the language of the ERISA
presents a formidable obstacle to appellant's argument. The
reason for Congress' decision to legislate with respect to
plans rather than to benefits becomes plain upon examination
F. 2d 320 (CA21985), aff'd mem.,- U. S . - (1986); Scott v. Gulf Oil
Corp ., 754 F . 2d 1499 (CA9 1985); 29 CFR § 2510.3- 1(a)(3) (1986). See
also discussion, infra, at - .
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of the purpose of both the preemption section and the regulatory scheme as a whole.
B
The second answer to appellant's argument is that preemption of the Maine statute would not further the purpose of
ERISA preemption. In analyzing whether ERISA's preemption section is applicable to the Maine law, "as in any preemption analysis, 'the purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone."' Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 747 (1985) (quoting Malone v. White
Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497, 504 (1978)). Attention to purpose is particularly necessary in this case because the terms
"employee benefit plan" and "plan" are defined only tautologically in the statute, each being described as "an employee
welfare benefit plan or employee pension benefit plan or a
plan which is both an employee welfare benefit plan and an
employee pension benefit plan." 29 U. S. C. § 1002(3).
Statements by ERISA's sponsors in the House and Senate
clearly disclose the problem that the preemption provision
was intended to address. In the House, Representative
Dent stated that "with the preemption of the field [of employee benefit plans], we round out the protection afforded
participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation." 120 Cong. Rec. 29197
(1974). Similarly, Senator Williams declared, "It should be
stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill,
the substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference
substitute are intended to preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans."
I d., at 29933.
These statements reflect recognition of the administrative
realities of employee benefit plans. An employer that makes
a commitment systematically to pay certain benefits undertakes a host of obligations, such as determining the eligibility
of claimants, calculating benefit levels, making disburse-

I •
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ments, monitoring the availability of funds for benefit payments, and keeping appropriate records in order to comply .
with applicable reporting requirements. The most efficient
way to meet these responsibilities is to establish a uniform
administrative scheme, which provides a set of standard procedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement of
benefits. Such a system is difficult to achieve, however, if a
benefit plan is subject to differing regulatory requirements in
differing states. A plan would be required to keep certain
records in some states but not in others; to make certain
benefits available in some states but not in others; to process
claims in a certain way in some states but not in others; and
to comply with certain fiduciary standards in some states but
not in others.
We have not hesitated to enforce ERISA's preemption provision where State law created the prospect that an employer's administrative scheme would be subject to conflicting requirements. In Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451
U. S. 504 (1981), for instance, we struck down a New Jersey
statute that prohibited offsetting worker compensation payments against pension benefits. Since such a practice is permissible under federal law and the law of other States, the
effect of the statute was to force the employer either to structure all its benefit payments in accordance with New Jersey
law, or to adopt different payment formulae for employees inside and outside the State. The employer therefore was required to accommodate conflicting regulatory schemes in devising and operating a system for processing claims and
paying benefits-precisely the burden that ERISA preemption was intended to avoid.
This point was emphasized in Shaw, supra, where we said
with respect to another form of State regulation, "[o]bligating the employer to satisfy the varied and perhaps conflicting
requirements of particular state fair employment laws ...
would make administration of a nationwide plan more difficult." 463 U. S., at 105 n. 25. Such a situation would
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produce considerable inefficiencies, which the employer
might choose to offset by lowering benefit levels. As the
Court in Shaw indicated, "ERISA's comprehensive preemption of state law was meant to minimize this sort of interference with the administration of employee benefit plans,"
ibid., so that employers would not have to "administer their
plans differently in each State in which they have employees." I d., at 105 (footnote omitted).
This concern about the effect of state regulation on the administration of benefit programs is reflected in Shaw's holding that only disability programs administered separately
from other benefit plans fall within ERISA's preemption exemption for plans maintained "for the purpose of complying
with
disability insurance laws."
29 U. S. C.
§ 1003(b)(3). To permit the exemption to apply to disability
benefits paid under a multibenefit plan was held to be inconsistent with the purpose of ERISA's preemption provision:
"An employer with employees in several States would
find its plan subject to a different jurisdictional pattern
of regulation in each State, depending on what benefits
the State mandated under disability, workmen's compensation, and unemployment compensation laws. The
administrative impracticality of permitting mutually exclusive pockets of federal and state jurisdiction within a
plan is apparent." Id., at 107-108.
It is thus clear that ERISA's preemption provision was
prompted by recognition that employers establishing and
maintaining employee benefit plans are faced with the task of
coordinating complex administrative activities. A patchwork scheme of regulation would introduce considerable inefficiencies in benefit program operation, which might lead
those employers with existing plans to reduce benefits, and
those without such plans to r~frain from adopting them.
Preemption ensures that the adminstrative practices of a
benefit plan will be governed by only a single set of regulations. See, e. g. , H. R. Rep. No. 93-533, 93rd Cong., 1st

'.
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Sess. 12 (1973) ("[A] fiduciary standard embodied in Federal
legislation is considered desirable because it will bring a
measure of uniformity in an area where decisions under the
same set of facts ·may differ from state to state").
Awareness of the purposes of ERISA's preemption provision makes clear that the Maine statute in no way raises the
types of concerns that prompted preemption. Congress intended preemption to afford employers the advantages of a
uniform set of administrative procedures governed by a single set of regulations. This concern only arises, however,
· with respect to benefits whose provision by nature requires
an ongoing administrative program to meet the employer's
obligation. It is for this reason that Congress preempted
state laws relating to plans, rather than simply to benefits.
Only a plan embodies a set of administrative practices vulnerable to the burden that would be imposed by a patchwork
scheme of regulation.
The Maine statute neither establishes, nor requires an employer to maintain, an employee benefit plan. The requirement of a one-time lump-sum payment triggered by a single
event requires no administrative scheme whatsoever to meet
the employer's obligation. The employer assumes no
responsibility to pay benefits on a regular basis, and thus
faces no periodic demands on its assets that create a need for
financial coordination and control. Rather, the employer's
obligation is predicated on the occurrence of a single contingency that may never materialize. The employer may well
never have to pay the severance benefits. To the extent that
the obligation to do so arises , satisfaction of that duty involves only making a single set of payments to employees at
the time the plant closes. To do little more than write a
check hardly constitutes the operation of a benefit plan. 6
In 1983, Congress amended ERISA to exempt from preemption certain
provisions of the Hawaii Act in place before the enactment of ERISA,
Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 393-1 through 393-51 (1976 and 1984 Supp.). 29
U. S. C. § 1144(b)(5). The amendment did not exempt from preemption
6
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Once this single event is over, the employer has no further
responsibility. The theoretical possibility of a one-time obligation in the future simply creates no need for an ongoing
administrative program for processing claims and paying
benefits.
·
This point is underscored by comparing the consequences
of the Maine statute with those produced by a state statute
requiring the establishment of a benefit plan. In Standard
Oil of California v. Agsalud, 633 F. 2d 760 (CA9 1980), aff'd
mem., 454 U. S. 801 (1981), for instance, Hawaii had required that employers provide employees with a comprehensive health care plan. The Hawaii law was struck down, for
it posed two types of problems. 7 First, the employer in that
case already had in place a health care plan governed by
ERISA, which did not comply in all respects with the Hawaii
Act. If the employer sought to achieve administrative efficiencies by integrating the Hawaii plan into its existing
plan, different components of its single plan would be subject
to different requirements. If it established a separate plan
to administer the program directed by Hawaii, it would lose
the benefits of maintaining a single administrative scheme.
Second, if Hawaii could demand the operation of a particular
benefit plan, so could other states, which would require that
the employer coordinate perhaps dozens of programs.
Agsalud thus illustrates that whether a State requires an existing plan to pay certain benefits, or whether it requires the
establishment of a separate plan where none existed before,
the problem is the same. Faced with the difficulty or impossibility of structuring administrative practices according to a
those portions of the law dealing with reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary
requirements.
'See Martori Bros . Distributors v. James-Massengale, 781 F . 2d 1349,
1358, amended on other grounds, 791 F. 2d 799 (CA9), cert. denied, U. S. - , (1986) ("It is difficult to see how the making of one-time
lump sum payments could constitute the establishment of a plan"). Cf.
Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F. 2d 1367, 1373 (CAll 1982) ("A decision to
extend benefits is not the establishment of a plan or program") .

.'
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set of uniform guidelines, an employer may decide to reduce
benefits or simply not to pay them at all.
By contrast, the Maine law does not put the employer to
the choice of either: (1) integrating a state-mandated ongoing
benefit plan with an existing plan or (2) establishing a separate plan to process and pay benefits under the plan required
by the State. This is because there is no State-mandated
benefit plan to administer. In this case, for instance, Fort
Halifax found no need to respond to passage of the Maine
statute by setting up an administrative scheme to meet its
contingent statutory obligation, any more than it would find
it necessary to set up an ongoing scheme to deal with the obligations it might face in the event that some day it might go
bankrupt. The company makes no contention that its statutory duty has in any way hindered its ability to operate its
retirement plan in uniform fashion, a plan that pays retirement, death, and permanent and total disability benefits on
an ongoing basis. App. 40. · The obligation imposed by the
Maine statute thus differs radically in impact from a requirement that an employer pay ongoing benefits on a continuous
basis.
The Maine statute therefore creates no impediment to an
employer's adoption of a uniform benefit administrative
scheme. Neither the possibility of a one-time payment in
the future, nor the act of making such a payment, in any way
creates the potential for the type of conflicting regulation of
benefit plans that ERISA preemption was intended to prevent. 8 As a result, preemption of the Maine law would not
Appellant notes that death benefits sometimes involve a one-time payment to beneficiaries, and that ERISA nonetheless defines an employee
welfare benefit plan to include a program that pays such benefits. 29
U. S. C. § 1002(1). Thus, it contends, the fact that the Maine statute requires a single payment does not mean that the statute does not establish a
plan. This argument, however, misunderstands what it is that makes a
plan a plan. While death benefits may represent a one-time payment from
the perspective of the beneficiaries, the employer clearly foresees the need
to make regular payments to survivors on an ongoing basis. The ongoing,
8
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serve the purpose for which ERISA's preemption provision
was enacted.

c
The third answer to appellant's argument is that the Maine
statute not only fails to implicate the concerns of ERISA's
preemption provision, it fails to implicate the regulatory concerns of ERISA itself. The Congressional declaration of policy, codified at 29 U. S. C. § 1001, states that ERISA was enacted because Congress found it desirable that "disclosure be
made and safeguards be provided with respect to the establishment, operation, and administration of [employee benefit]
plans." I d., at § 1001(a). Representative Dent, the House
sponsor of the legislation, represented that ERISA's fiduciary standards "will prevent abuses of the special responsibilities borne by those dealing with plans." 120 Cong. Rec.
29197 (1974). Senator Williams, the Senate sponsor, stated
that these standards would safeguard employees from "such
abuses as self-dealing, imprudent investing, and misappropriation of plan funds." I d., at 29932 (1974). The focus of
the statute thus is on the administrative integrity of benefit
plans-which presumes that some type of administrative activity is taking place. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 1785, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 46 ("In electing deliberately to preclude state
authority over these plans, Congress acted to insure uniformity of regulation with respect to their activities'); 120 Cong.
Rec. 29197 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dent) (disclosure andreporting requirements "will enable both participants and the
Federal Government to monitor the plans' operations") (empredictable nature of this obligation therefore creates the need for an administrative scheme to process claims and pay out benefits, whether those
benefits are received by beneficiaries in a lump sum or on a periodic basis.
This is borne out by the fact that death benefits are included in appellant's
retirement plan, with instructions on how eligibility is to be determined,
benefit levels calculated, and disbursements made. App. 54-56. By contrast, appellant's statutory obligation did not prompt the establishment of
any payment program, since there were no ongoing benefits to be paid.

•.
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phasis added); id., at 29935 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits)
(disclosure meant to provide employees information "covering in detail the fiscal operations of their plan") (emphasis
added).
The foregoing makes clear both why ERISA is concerned
with regulating benefit "plans," and why the Maine statute
does not establish one. Only "plans" involve administrative
activity potentially subject to employer abuse. The obligation imposed by Maine generates no such activity. There is
no occasion to determine whether a "plan" is "operated" in
the interest of its beneficiaries, because nothing is "operated." No financial transactions take place that would be
listed in an annual report, and no further information regarding the terms of the severance pay obligation is needed because the statute itself makes these terms clear. It would
make no sense for preemption to clear the way for exclusive
federal regulation, for there would be nothing to regulate.
Under such circumstances, preemption would in no way
serve the overall purpose of ERISA.
D

Appellant contends that failure to preempt the Maine law
will create the opportunity for employers to circumvent
ERISA's regulatory requirements by persuading a State to
require the type of benefit plan that the employer otherwise
would establish on its own. That may be so under the rationale offered by the state Supreme Court, but that is not
the rationale on which we rely today.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court rested its decision on
the premise that ERISA only preempts state regulation of
preexisting benefit plans established by the employer, and
not state-mandated benefit plans. We agree that such an
approach would afford employers a readily available means of
evading ERISA's regulatory scope, thereby depriving employees of the protections of that statute. In addition, it
would permit States to circumvent ERISA's preemption pro-
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vision, by allowing them to require directly what they are
forbidden to regulate. In contrast, our analysis of the purpose of ERISA preemption makes clear why the mere fact
that a plan is required by a State is insufficient to fend off
preemption. The requirements imposed by a State's establishment of a benefit plan would pose a formidable barrier to
the development of a uniform set of administrative practices.
As Agsalud, supra, illustrates, an employer would be put to
the choice of operating separate ongoing benefit plans or a
single plan subject to different regulatory requirements, and
would face the prospect that numerous other States would
impose their own distinct requirements-a result squarely inconsistent with the goal of ERISA preemption.
Appellant's arguments are thus well taken insofar as they
are addressed to the reasoning of the court below. We have
demonstrated, supra, however, they have no force with respect to a state statute that, as here, does not establish a
plan. Such a statute generates no program activity that normally would be subject to ERISA regulation. Enforcement
of the Maine statute presents no risk either that an employer
will evade or that a State will dislodge otherwise applicable
federal regulatory requirements. Nor is there any prospect
that an employer will face difficulty in operating a unified administrative scheme for paying benefits. The rationale on
which we rely thus does not create the dangers that appellant
contends will result from upholding the Maine law.
Appellant also argues that its contention that the severance obligation under the Maine statute is an ERISA plan is
supported by Holland v. Burlington Industries, 772 F. 2d
1140 (CA4 1985), aff'd mem. , U. S. (1986), and Gilbert v. Burlington Industries, 765 F. 2d 320 (CA2 1985), aff'd
mem., - - U. S. - - (1986). We disagree. Those cases
hold that a plan that pays severance benefits out of general
assets is an ERISA plan. That holding is completely consistent with our analysis above. There was no question in
the Burlington cases, as there is in this case, whether the

..
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employer had a "plan"; 9 there was a "plan" and the only issue
was whether the type of benefits paid by that plan are among
those covered by ERISA. The precise question was simply
whether severance benefits paid by a plan out of general assets, rather than out of a trust fund, should be regarded as
employee welfare benefits under 29 U. S. C. § 1002. 10
The courts' conclusion that they should be so regarded took
into account ERISA's central focus on administrative integrity: if an employer has an administrative scheme for paying
benefits, it should not be able to evade the requirements of
the statute merely by paying those benefits out of general assets. Some severence benefit obligations by their nature necessitate an ongoing administrative scheme, but others do
not. Those that do not, such as the obligation imposed in
this case, simply do not involve a state law that "relate[s] to"
an employee benefit "plan." 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a). 11 The
Burlington cases therefore do not support appellant's
argument.
E
ERISA preemption analysis "must be guided by respect
for the separate spheres of governmental authority preserved in our federalist system." Alessi v. Raybestos-M anThe employer had made a commitment to pay severance benefits to employees as each person left employment. This commitment created the
need for an administrative scheme to pay these benefits on an ongoing
basis, and the company had distributed both a Policy Manual and Employees' Handbook that provided details on matters such as eligibility, benefit
levels, and payment schedules. 772 F. 2d, at 1143-1144 and n. 1; 765 F.
2d, at 323.
10
The question arose because§ 1002(1)(B) provides that an employee welfare benefit plan includes a plan that provides benefits described in 29
U. S. C. § 186(c). The latter section lists, inter alia, money paid by an
employer to a trust fund for severance benefits.
"Thus, if a State required a benefit whose regularity of payment necessarily required an ongoing benefit program, it could not evade preemption
by the simple expedient of somehow formally characterizing the obligation
as a one-time lump-sum payment triggered by the occurrence of a certain
contingency.
9

86-341-0PINION
FORT HALIFAX PACKING CO. v. COYNE

16

hattan, Inc., 451 U. S. 504, 522 (1981). The argument that
ERISA preempts state laws relating to certain employee
benefits, rather than to employee benefit plans, is refuted by
the express language of the statute, the purposes of the preemption provision, and the regulatory focus of ERISA as a
whole. If a State creates no prospect of conflict with a federal statute, there is no warrant for disabling it from attempting to address uniquely local social and economic problems. 12 Since the Maine severance payment statute raises no
danger of such conflict, we hold that the statute is not preempted by ERISA.
III
Appellant also contends that Maine's statute is preempted
by the NLRA. In so arguing, the Company relies on the
strand of NLRA preemption analysis that forbids States
from "imposing additional restrictions on economic weapons
of self-help." Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles,-- U.S.--,-- (1986). 13 Restriction on state activity in this area rests on the theory that preemption is necessary to further Congress' intent that "the conduct involved
be unregulated because left 'to be controlled by the free play
of economic forces.'" Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 427 U. S. 132, 140 (1976) (quoting NLRB
v. Nash-Finch co., 404 U. S. 138, 144 (1971)).
Appellant concedes that, unlike cases in which state laws
have been struck down under this doctrine, Maine has not di2

During the decade between 1971 and 1981, a total of 107 plants were
closed in Maine, resulting in the direct loss of 21,215 jobs. Leighton, Plant
Closings in Maine: Law and Reality, in Plant Closing Legislation 1 (A.
Aboud ed., 1984). Taking into account the multiplier effects of these job
losses on the local communities, it is estimated that the total number of
jobs lost in Maine during this period was 49,219. !d., at 3. These losses
were concentrated in the poorer counties of the State and in the lower
wage industries, resulting in a significant burden on local public and private social service agencies. I d., at 4.
'a The National Labor Relations Act contains no express preemption
provision.
'
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rectly regulated any economic activity of either of the parties. See, e. g., Machinists, supra, (State enjoined union
members from continuing to refuse to work overtime); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485 (1953) (State enjoined
union picketing). Nor has the State sought directly to force
a party to forgo the use of one of its economic weapons. See,
e. g., Golden State Transit, supra, (City Council conditioned
taxicab franchise renewal on settlement of strike). Nonetheless, appellant maintains that the Maine law intrudes on
the bargaining activities of the parties because the prospect
of a statutory obligation undercuts an employer's ability to
withstand a union's. demand for severance pay.
This argument-that a State's establishment of minimum
substantive labor standards undercuts collective bargaining-was considered and rejected in Metropolitan Life,
supra. That case involved a state law requiring that
minimumum mental health benefits be provided under certain health insurance p<1licies. Appellants there presented
the same argument that appellant makes in this case: "because Congress intended to leave the choice of terms in collective-bargaining agreements to the free play of economic
forces, ... mandated-benefit laws should be preempted by
the NLRA." 471 U. S., at 748. The Court held, however,
that the NLRA is concerned with ensuring an equitable bargaining process, not with the substantive terms that may
emerge from such bargaining. "The evil Congress was addressing thus was entirely unrelated to local or federal regulation establishing minimum terms of employment." I d., at
754. Such regulation provides protections to individual
union and non-union workers alike, and thus "neither encourage[s] nor discourage[s] the collective-bargaining processes
that are the subject of the NLRA." I d., at 755. Furthermore, preemption should not be lightly inferred in this area,
since the establishment of labor standards falls within the
traditional police power of the State. As a result, held the
Court, "[w]hen a state law establishes a minimal employment

.

.
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standard not inconsistent with the general legislative goals of
the NLRA, it conflicts with none of the purposes of the Act."
I d., at 757.
It is true that the Maine statute gives employees something for which they otherwise might have to
bargain. That is true, however, with regard to any state
law that substantively regulates employment conditions.
Both employers and employees come to the bargaining table
with rights under state law that form a "backdrop" for their
negotiations. Ibid . (quoting Taggart v. Weinacker's , Inc.,
397 U. S. 223, 228 (1970) (concurring opinion)). Absent a
collective bargaining agreement, for instance, state common
law generally permits an employer to run the workplace as it
wishes. The employer enjoys this authority without having
to bargain for it. The parties may enter negotiations designed to alter this state of affairs, but, if impasse is reached,
the employer may rely on preexisting state law to justify its
authority to make employment decisions; that same state law
defines the rights and duties of employees. Similarly, Maine
provides that employer and employees may negotiate with
the intention of establishing severance pay terms. If impasse is reached, however, preexisting state law determines
the right of employees to a certain level of severance pay and
the duty of the employer to provide it. Thus, the mere fact
that a state statute pertains to matters over which the parties are free to bargain cannot support a claim of preemption,
for "there is nothing in the NLRA ... which expressly forecloses all state regulatory power with respect to those issues
... that may be the subject of collective bargaining." Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497, 504-505 (1978).
Appellant maintains that this case is distinguishable from
Metropolitan Life. It points out that, unlike Metropolitan
Life, the statutory obligation at issue here is optional, since it
applies only in the absence of an agreement between employer and employees. Therefore, the Company argues, the
Maine law cannot be regarded as establishing a genuine minimum labor standard. The fact that the parties are free to

~.
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devise their own severance pay arrangements, however,
strengthens the case that the statute works no intrusion on
collective bargaining. Maine has sought to balance the desirability of a particular substantive labor standard against
the right of self-determination regarding the terms and conditions of employment. If a statute that permits no collective bargaining on a subject escapes NLRA preemption, see
Metropolitan Life, surely one that permits such bargaining
cannot be preempted. 14
We therefore find that Maine's severance payment law is
"a valid and unexceptional exercise of the [State's] police
power." Metropolitan Life, supra, at 758. Since "Congress
developed the framework for self-organization and collective
bargaining of the NLRA within the larger body of state law
promoting public health and safety," ibid., the Maine statute
is not preempted by the NLRA. 15
IV
We hold that the Maine severance pay statute is not preempted by ERISA, since it does not "relate to any employee
benefit plan" under that statute. 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a). We
hold further that the law is not preempted by the NLRA,
since its establishment of a minimum labor standard does not
impermissibly intrude upon the collective bargaining process.
Appellant also contends that, unlike the statute in Metropolitan Life,
the Maine law does not fall equally upon union and non-union employees.
Non-union employers, it argues, are free unilaterally to escape their statutory obligation by establishing severance payment levels, while unionized
employers must engage in collective bargaining in order to achieve the
same result. Any difference in the ease of establishing alternative severance payment obligations, however, flows not from the statute, but from
the basic fact that a non-union employer is freer to set employment terms
than is a unionized employer.
15
We also find no support for an argument of preemption under the rule
established in San Diego Building Trades v. Garmon, 359 v. 236 (1959),
since the Maine statute does not purport to regulate any conduct subject to
regulation by the National Labor Relations Board. See Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 748-749 (1985).
14
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The judgment of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court is
therefore
Affirmed.

May 9, 1987

86-341, Fort Halifax Packing v. Coyne

Dear Bi 11:
You will recall that my vote at Conference was tentative. I still expect to be with you on the judgment in this
case and I probably will join your opin5.on. For now, however, I would like to await further writing.
~incerely,

Justice Brennan
lfp/ss
cc:

-~ •.

t .

The Conference

.Stt;trtutt (!fttud ttf tltt ~tb ~tatu

11attJrin¢on. ~.

<If.

20,;;~~

CHAMBERS 0~

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

May I L 1987

RE:

No. 86-341-Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Daniel
Coyne

Dear BiII :
Please join me.
Sincerely,

(/I«T.M.

Justice Brennan
cc: The Conference

Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice

Blackmun
Powell
Stevens
O'Connor
Scalia

From:

Justice White

Circulated:

MAY 2 6 1987

Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 86-341

FORT HALIFAX PACKING COMPANY, INC. , APPELLANT v. P. DANIEL COYNE, DIRECTOR, BUREAU
OF LABOR STANDARDS OF MAINE, ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MAINE
[May -

, 1987]

dissenting.
The Court rejects appellant's pre-emption challenge to
Maine's severance-pay statute by reasoning that the statute
jWt 9~ ~
does not create a "plan" under ERISA because it does notrequire an "administrative scheme" to administer the payment ~t~
of severance benefits. By making preemption turn on the
existence of an "administrative scheme," the Court creates a c:£~~
loophole in ERISA's preemption statute, 29 U. . C. § 1144, ~ ~-t.,u ~ Wfd56
whiCnwilTuiiaerrnine Congress' decision to make employeehe ~?
benefit plans a mat er of exc usive federa regula 10n.
Court's rule ~Bhs e
a mmistrative
scheme" as a prerequisite for ERISA preemption will allow
states to effec 1ve y 1ctate a wide array of employee benefits
that must be prov1 ed by employers by simply characterizing
them as non-" administrative." The Court has also chosen to
ignore completely what precedent exists as to what constitutes a "plan" under ERISA. I dissent because it is incredible to believe that Congress intended that the broad preemption provision contained in ERISA would depend upon
the extent to which an employer exercised administrative
foresight in preparing for the eventual payment of employee
benefits.
ERISA preempts "any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to a~- em.PlQYee b~nefit 1h 0l '--1.,
plan.... " 29 U. S. C. § 1144. Congress defined an "em- ~~~
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ployee benefit plan" as "any plan, fund, or program which
was heretofore or is hereafter established- ormaintained by
an employer or an employee organization" and which provides certain benefits, incl~~s~v~r~nce p~. 29 U. S. C.
§ 1002(1). See Gilbert v. /Jurlingatonton 'riU1U
n ussttrries, 765 F. 2d
320, 325 (CA2 1985), summarily aff'd,- U. S . - (1986).
A state law "which requires employers to pay employees specific benefits clearly 'relate[s] to' benefit plans" as contemplated by ERISA's preemption provision. Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U. S. 85, 97 (1983). I would have
thought this to be the end of the pre-emption inquiry. Here,
the Maine statute clearly creates an employee benefit plan,
and having created an ERISA plan, the statute plainly "relates to" such a plan. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, in
effect, acknowledged as much, but held that Maine's statute
was not preempted by ERISA because it was created by the
State Legislature instead of by a private employer. Apparently recognizing the flaw inherent in this reasoning, the rnajority nevertheless struggles to achieve its desired result by
asserting that the statute does not create a "plan" because it
does not require an employer to establish an administrative
scheme. I cannot accept this conclusion.
First, § 1002(1) establishes no requirement that a "plan"
meet any specific formalities or that there be some policy
manual or employee handbook to effectuate it. Cf. ante, at
- - , n. 9. In reading such a requirement into§ 1002(1), the
majority ignores the obvious: when a Maine employer is
called upon to discharge its legislatively-mandated duty
under the severance pay statute, the funds from which it
pays the benefits do not materialize out of thin air. The
Maine legislature has presumed, as it is so entitled, that employers will comply with the dictates of the statute's requirements. That an employer's liability is contingent upon an
event that may never happen does not make the plan that the
legislature has imposed upon employers any less of a plan.
And, -heeanse there may ~ imprudent employers who
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either are unaware of the severance pay statute or order
their business affairs as if the statute's obligations do not
exist-and it is upon the behavior of this class of employers
that the majority seemingly relies in concluding that the severance pay statute does not embody ·an "administrative
scheme"-in no way supports the remarkable conclusion that
the statutory obligations do not constitute a plan for the payment of severance benefits.
Second, in concluding that Maine's statute does not establish a "plan" as contemplated by ERISA, the Court over- /ll?uJ ~
rules, sub silento, rec~ourC(iuoert v.
Burlington Industries, 765 F. 2d 320 (CA2 1985), summarily tv-e.~~
aff'd, - - U. S. - - (1986), involved an employer's policy to ~f(0tpay severance benefits to employees who were involuntarily
~ .:::(_..,
terminated. The employer had no separate fund from which
to make severance-pay payments, and, of particular note,
'¢3'~·~''
there was virtually no "administrative scheme" to effectuate
the program. "The granting or denial of severance pay was &j/'kt~f~~-&.-automatic upon termination. Plaintiffs [employees] allege
that Burlington never sought to comply with ERISA respecting its severance ·pay policy. That is, they claim that: it
never published or filed an annual report, a financial statement, a plan description or a ~tatement of plan modifications;
it did not designate a fiduciary for the plan or inform employees of their rights under ERISA and the plan; there was no
established claims procedure; and, apart from the company's
'open door' grievance policy, there was no established appeals
procedure." Gilbert, supra, at 323. The employees and numerous amici claimed that "a promise or agreement to pay
severance benefits, without more, does not constitute a welfare benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA." I d., at
324. The Second Circuit rejected this contention, id., at
325, and we summarily affirmed, - - U. S. - - (1986).
See also Holland v. Burlington Industries, 772 F. 2d 1140
(CA4 1985), summarily aff'd.,- U. S . - (1986).
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The Court characterizes Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 633
F. 2d 760, 766 (~80), summarily aff'd, 454 U. S. 801
(1981), as holding that ERISA pre-empted Hawaii's health
care statute because it impaired employers' ability to "structur[e] [their] administrative practices according to a set of
uniform guidelines." Ante, at--. But that case involved
more than administrative uniformity. Indeed, in Agsalud,
the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected the argument that
ERISA was concerned only with the administration of benefit plans, not state statutes which require employers to provide particular employee benefits: "Appellants in the district
court argued that since ERISA was concerned primarily with
the administration of benefit plans, its provisions were not intended to prevent the operation of laws like the Hawaii Act
pertaining principally to benefits rather than administration.
There is, however, nothing in the statute to support such a
distinction between the state laws relating to benefits as opposed to administration." Id., at 765. The Ninth Circuit
held that the Hawaii Act "directly and expressly regulates
employers and the type of benefits they provide employees.
It must 'relate to' employee benefit plans within the meaning
of of ERISA's broad pre-emption provision .... " Id., at
766. Representatives of the State of Hawaii appealed to this
Court, No. 80-1841, claiming, inter alia, that the State's police power permits it to require employers to provide certain
employee benefits, and that Hawaii's statute "in no way conflicts with any substantive provision of ERISA, since that
statute requires no benefits at all." Juris. Statement 7. We
disagreed and summarily affirmed. 454 U. S. 801 (1981).
The Court's "administrative-scheme" rationale provides
states with a means of circumventing congressional intent,
clearly expressed in§ 1144, to pre-empt all state laws that relate to employee benefit plans. For that reason, dissent. ·
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Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 1001-1381
(ERISA), or the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C.
§§ 157-158 (NLRA). The statute was upheld by the Maine
Superior Court, Civ. Action No. CV81-516 (Oct. 29, 1982),
and by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, 510 A. 2d 1054
(1986). We granted certioriari, - - U. S. - - (1986), and
now affirm.
I
In 1972, Fort Halifax Packing Company (Fort Halifax or
Company) purchased a poultry packaging and processing
plant that had operated in Winslow, Maine for almost two
decades. The Company continued to operate the plant for
almost another decade, until, on May 23, 1981, it discontinued operations at the plant and laid off all its employees except several maintenance and clerical workers. At the time
of closing, over 100 employees were on the payroll. Fortyfive had worked in the plant for over 10 years, 19 for over 20
years, and two for 29 years. Plaintiff's Supplementary Response to Employee List, Exhibit A (June 3, 1983). Following the closing, the Company met with State officials and
with representatives of Local 385 of the Amalgamated Meat
Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, which represented many of the employees who had worked in the plant.
While Fort Halifax initially suggested that reopening the
plant might be feasible if the union agreed to certain concessions in the form of amendments to the collective bargaining
agreement, ultimately the Company decided against resuming operations and to close the plant.
On October 30, 1981, eleven employees filed suit in Superior Court seeking severance pay pursuant to 26 M. R. S. A.
§ 625-B (1986 Supp.). This statute, note 1, ·supra, provides
that any employer that terminates operations at a plant with
100 or more employees, or relocates those operations more
than 100 miles away, must provide one week's pay for each
year of employment to all employees who have worked in the
plant at least three years. The employer has no such liabil-
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ity if the employee accepts employment at the new location,
or if the employee is covered by a contract that deals with the
issue of severance pay. I d., at § 625-B(2)-(3). Under authority granted by the statute, the Maine Director of the Bureau of Labor Standards also commenced an action to enforce
the provisions of the state law, which action superceded the
suit filed by the employees. 2
The Superior Court, ruling on cross-motions for summary
judgment, granted the Director's motion, holding that Fort
Halifax is liable for severance pay under the statute. Civ.
Action No. CV81-516 (Oct. 29, 1982). The Maine Supreme
Judicial Court affirmed. 510 A. 2d 1054 (1986r.- Thecourt
-, .
rejected the Company's contention that the plant-closing
statute was preempted by ERISA, h~ding that~~re
empted only benefit plans crea~e~ ~y~s or employee
organizat~059:'- lfooserved tFlat ..the severance
r~~bility in this case results from the operation of the
~a~rather than from the operation of an employercreated benefit plan. Ibid . Therefore, reasoned the court,
"[i]nasmuch as § 625-B does not implicate a plan created by
an employer or employee organization, it cannot be said to be
preempted by ERISA." Ibid. The court also rejected the
argument that the state provision was preempted by the
NLRA because it regulated conduct covered by either §§ 7 or
8 of that statute. It found that the Maine statute applies
equally to union and nonunion employees, and reflects "the
state's substantial interest in protecting Maine citizens from

--

2

-~-

Section 625-B(5) of the Maine statute provides in relevant part:
"5. Suits by the director. The director is authorized to supervise the payment of the unpaid severance pay owing to any employee under this section. The director may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the amount of any unpaid severance pay. The right
provided by subsection 4 to bring an action by or on behalf of any employee, and of any employee to become a party plaintiff to any such action,
shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by the director in an action
under this subsection, unless the action is dismissed without prejudice by
the director . . . "
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the economic dislocation that accompanies la~nt
cl<@_ngs." I d., at 1062. As a result, the court found that
eligible employees were entitled to severance pay due to the
closure of the plant at Winslow. 3
We hold that the Maine statute is not preempted by
ERISA, not for the reason offer db the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, but because the statute neither establishes,_por
requires an employer to maintain, an employee welfare benefit "g@_n" un er t iaflecreraiStatute. 4 We hold further that
the Marne la~d by the NLRA, since it establishes a minimum labor standard that does not intrude upon
the collective bargaining process. As a result, we affirm the
judgment of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court that the
Maine statute is not preempted by either ERISA or the
NLRA.
II
Appellant's basic argument is that any state law pertaining
to a type of employee benefit listed in ERISA necessarily
regulates an employee benefit plan, and therefore must be
preempted. Because severance benefits are included in
ERISA, see 29 U. S. C. § 1002(1)(B), appellant argues that
ERISA preempts the Maine statute. 5 In effect, appellant
Ninety-three employees of the plant are eligible for lump-sum payments ranging from $490 to $11,500. The total amount due is about
$256,600. Affidavit of Xavier J. Dietrich, Exhibit A (August 13, 1984).
'Because we hold that the obligation created by the Maine statute does
not involve a plan, we do not address the State's alternative argument
that, even if the law does establish a plan, it is not preempted by virtue of
the exemption for plans "maintained solely for the purpose of complying
with applicable .. . unemployment compensation laws." 29 U. S. C.
§ 1003(b)(3).
6
Section 1002(1)(B) defines an employee welfare benefit plan as a plan
that pays, inter alia, benefits described in 29 U. S. C. § 186(c). The latter
section includes, inter alia, money paid by an employer to a trust fund to
pay for severance benefits. Section 1002(1)(B) has been construed to include severance benefits paid out of general assets, as well as out of a trust
fund. See Holland v. Burlington Industries, 772 F. 2d 1140 (CA4 1985),
aff'd mem., - U. S . - (1986); Gilbert v. Burlington Industries, 765
3
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argues that ERISA forecloses virtually all state legislation
regarding employee benefits. This contention fails, however, in light of the plain language of ERISA's preemption
provision, the underlying purpose of that provision, and the
overall objectives of ERISA itself.
A

The first answer to appellant's argument is found in the~
pre.ss l®gug~ute. ERISA's preemption provision does not refer to state laws relating to "employee benefits", but to state laws relating to "employee benefit plans":
'
"the provisions of this subchapter
. . . shall supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee b ne t plan aescribed in
§ 1003(a) of this title an not exempt under § 1003(b) of
this title." 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a) (emphasis added).
We have held that the words "relate to" should be construed
expansively: "[a] law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in
the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or
reference to such a plan." Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U. S.
85, 97 (1983). Nothing in our case law, however, supports
appellant's position that the word "plan" should in effect be
read out of the statute. Indeed, Shaw itself speaks of a state
law's connection with or reference to a plan. Ibid. The
words "benefit" and "plan" are used separately throughout
ERISA, -and'nowhere Tilthe statute are they treated as the
equivalent of one ano er.
1v
e as1c difference betwe~plan," Congress' choice of language
is significant in its preemption of only the latter.
Thus, as a first matter, the language of the ERISA
presents a formidable obstacle to appellant's argument. The
reason for Congress' decision to legislate with respect to
F. 2d 320 (CA21985), aff'd mem.,- U. S . - (1986); Scott v. Gulf Oil
See
also discussion, infra, a t - .

Corp., 754 F. 2d 1499 (CA9 1985); 29 CFR § 2510.3-1(a)(3) (1986).
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plans rather than to benefits becomes plain upon examination
of the purpose of both the preemption section and the regulatory scheme as a whole.
B

The second answer to appellant's argument is that preemption of the Maine statute would not further the purpose of
ERI~eemption. In anaiYZiJ1gWhetilerERfSA's preemption seCtiOn is applicable to the Maine law, "as in any preemption analysis, 'the purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone."' Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 747 (1985) (quoting Malone v. White
Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497, 504 (1978)). Attention to purpose is particularly necessary in this case because the terms
"employee benefit plan" and "plan" are defined only tautologically in the statute, each being described as "an employee
welfare benefit plan or emplo ee ension benefit plan or a
plan wnich is ot an em oyee welfare benefit p an and an
employee pension bene t p an.'
9 . . C. § 1002(3).
Statements by ERISA's sponsors in the House and Senate
clearly disclose the problem that the preemption provision
was intended to address. In the House, Representative
Dent stated that "with the preemption of the field [of employee benefit plans], we round out the protection afforded
participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State and local regulation." 120 Cong. Rec. 29197
(1974). Similarly, Senator Williams declared, "It should be
stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill,
the substantive and enforcement provisions of the conference
substitute are intended to preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans."
I d., at 29933.
These statements reflect recognition of the administrative
realities of employee benefit plans. An employer that makes
a commitment systematically to pay certain benefits undertakes a host of obligations, such as determining the eligibility
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of claimants, calculating benefit levels, making disbursements, monitoring the availability of funds for benefit payments, and keeping appropriate records in order to comply
with applicable reporting requirements. The most efficient
way to meet these responsibilities is to establish a uniform
administrative scheme, which provides a set of standard procedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement of
benefits. Such a system is difficult to achieve, however, if a
benefit plan is subject to differing regulatory requirements in
differing states. A plan would be required to keep certain
records in some states but not in others; to make certain
benefits available in some states but not in others; to process
claims in a certain way in some states but not in others; and
to comply with certain fiduciary standards in some states but
not in others.
We have not hesitated to enforce ERISA's preemption provision where State law created the prospect that an employer's administrative scheme would be subject to conflicting requirements. In Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451
U. S. 504 (1981), for instance, we ~ruck down a New Jersey
statute that prohibited offsetting worker compensation payments against pension benefits. Since such a practice is permissible under federal law and the law of other States, the
effect of the statute was to force the employer either to structure all its benefit payments in accordance with New Jersey
law, or to adopt different payment formulae for employees inside and outside the State. The employer therefore was required to accommodate conflicting regulatory schemes in devising and operating a system for processing claims and
paying benefits-precisely the burden that ERISA preemption was intended to avoid.
This point was emphasized in Shaw, supra, where we said
with respect to another form of State regulation, "[o]bligating the employer to satisfy the varied and perhaps conflicting
requirements of particular state fair employment laws . . .
would make administration of a nationwide plan more diffi-
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cult." 463 U. S., at 105 n. 25. Such a situation would
produce considerable inefficiencies, which the employer
might choose to offset by lowering benefit levels. As the
Court in Shaw indicated, "ERISA's comprehensive preemption of state law was meant to minimize this sort of interference with the administration of employee benefit plans,"
ibid., so that employers would not have to "administer their
plans differently in each State in which they have employees." ld., at 105 (footnote omitted).
This concern about the effect of state regulation on the administration of benefit programs is reflected in Shaw's holding that only disability programs administered separately
from other benefit plans fall within ERISA's preemption exemption for plans maintained "for the purpose of complying
29 U. S. C.
with
disability insurance laws."
§ 1003(b)(3). To permit the exemption to apply to disability
benefits paid under a multibenefit plan was held to be inconsistent with the purpose of ERISA's preemption provision:
"An employer with employees in several States would
find its plan subject to a different jurisdictional pattern
of regulation in each State, depending on what benefits
the State mandated under disability, workmen's compensation, and unemployment compensation laws. The
administrative impracticality of permitting mutually exclusive pockets of federal and state jurisdiction within a
plan is apparent." ld., at 107-108.
It is thus clear that ERISA's preemption provision was
prompted by recognition that enlpioyers esta6Iishing and
maintaining employee benefit plans are faced with the task of
coordinating complex administrative activities. A patchwork scheme ofregulatronwou1d introauce considerable inefficiencies in benefit program operation, which might lead
those employers with existing plans to reduce benefits, and
those without such plans to refrain from adopting them.
Preemption ensures that the adminstrative practices of a
benefit plan will be governed by only a single set of regula-
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tions. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 93-533, 93rd Cong., 1st
Sess. 12 (1973) ("[A] fiduciary standard embodied in Federal
legislation is considered desirable because it will bring a
measure of uniformity in an area where decisions under the
same set of facts may differ from state to state").
Awareness of the purposes of ERISA's preemption provision makes clear that the Maine statute in no way raises the
types of concerns that prompted preemption. Congress intended preemption to afford employers the advantages of a
uniform set of administrative procedures governed by a single set of regulations. This concern only arises, however,
with respect to benefits whose provision by nature requires
an ongoing administrative program to meet the employer's
obligation. It is for this reason that Congress preempted
state laws relating to plans, rather than simply to benefits.
Only a plan embodies a set of administrative practices vulnerable to the burden that would be imposed by a patchwork
scheme of regulation.
The Maine statute neither establishes, nor requires an emplo~amJam, an e.!!lp oyee enefit plan~ Tfie requirement ora one-lime lump-sum paymenttflggered by a single
event requires no administrative scheme whatsoever to meet
the employer's obligation. The employer assumes no
responsibility to pay benefits on a regular basis, and thus
faces no periodic demands on its assets that create a need for
financial coordination and control. Rather, the employer's
obligation is predicated on the occurrence of a single contingency that may never materialize. The employer may well
never have to pay the severance benefits. To the extent that
the obligation to do so arises, satisfaction of that duty involves only making a single set of payments to employees at
the time the plant closes. To do little more than write a
check hardly constitutes the operation of a benefit plan. 6
6

In 1983, Congress amended ERISA to exempt from preemption certain
provisions of the Hawaii Act in place before the enactment of ERISA,
Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 393-1 through 393-51 (1976 and 1984 Supp.). 29
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Once this single event is over, the employer has no further
responsibility. The theoretical possibility of a one-time obligation in the future simply creates no need for an ongoing
administrative program for processing claims and paying
benefits.
This point is underscored by comparing the consequences
of the Maine statute with those produced by a state statute
requiring the establishment of a benefit plan. In Standard
Oil of California v. Agsalud, 633 F. 2d 760 (CA9 1980), aff'd
mem., 454 U. S. 801 (1981), for instance, Hawaii had required that employers provide employees with a comprehensive health care plan. The Hawaii law was struck down, for
it posed two types of problems. 7 First, the employer in that
case already had in place a health care plan governed by
ERISA, which did not comply in all respects with the Hawaii
Act. If the employer sought to achieve administrative efficiencies by integrating the Hawaii plan into its existing
plan, different components of its single plan would be subject
to different requirements. If it established a separate plan
to administer the program directed by Hawaii, it would lose
the benefits of maintaining a single administrative scheme.
Second, if Hawaii could demand the operation of a particular
benefit plan, so could other states, which would require that
the employer coordinate perhaps dozens of programs.
Agsalud thus illustrates that whether a State requires an existing plan to pay certain benefits, or whether it requires the
establishment of a separate plan where none existed before,
the problem is the same. Faced with the difficulty or imposU. S. C. § 1144(b)(5). The amendment did not exempt from preemption
those portions of the Jaw dealing with reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary
requirements.
'See Martori Bros . Distributors v. James-Massengale, 781 F. 2d 1349,
1358, amended on other grounds, 791 F. 2d 799 (CA9), cert . denied, U. S. - , - (1986) ("It is difficult to see how the making of one-time
Jump sum payments could constitute the establishment of a plan"). Cf.
Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F. 2d 1367, 1373 (CAll 1982) ("A decision to
extend benefits is not the establishment of a plan or program").
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sibility of structuring administrative practices according to a
set of uniform guidelines, an employer may decide to reduce
benefits or simply not to pay them at all. 8
By contrast, the Maine law does not put the employer to
the choice of either: (1) integrating a state-mandated ongoing
benefit plan with an existing plan or (2) establishing a separate plan to process and pay benefits under the plan required
by the State. This is because there is no State-mandated
benefit plan to administer. In this case, for instance, Fort
Halifax found no need to respond to passage of the Maine
statute by setting up an administrative scheme to meet its
contingent statutory obligation, any more than it would find
it necessary to set up an ongoing scheme to deal with the obligations it might face in the event that some day it might go
bankrupt. The company makes no contention that its statutory duty has in any way hindered its ability to operate its
retirement plan in uniform fashion, a plan that pays retirement, death, · and permanent and total disability benefits on
an ongoing basis. App. 40. The obligation imposed by the
Maine statute thus differs radically in impact from a requirement that an employer pay ongoing benefits on a continuous
basis.
The Maine statute therefore creates no impediment to an
employer's adoption of a uniform benefit administrative
scheme. Neither the possibility of a one-time payment in
the future, nor the act of making such a payment, in any way
The dissent draws support for its position from the the court's rejection
in Agsalud of the argument that only state laws relating to plan administration, as opposed to~enefits, are preempted by ERISA. Post, at
- . The court's position, however, no more than acknowledges what we
have said in our discussion, supra: state laws requiring the payment of
benefits also "relate to a[n] employee benefit plan" if they attempt to dictate what benefits shall be paid under a plan. To hold otherwise would
create the prospect that plan administration would be subject to differing
requirements regarding benefit eligibility and benefit levels-precisely the
type of conflict that ERISA's preemption provision was intended to
prevent.
8
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creates the potential for the type of conflicting regulation of
benefit plans that ERISA preemption was intended to prevent. 9 As a result, preemption of the Maine law would not
serve the purpose for which ERISA's preemption provision
was enacted.

c

The third answer to appellant's argument is that the Maine
statute not only fails to implicate the concerns of ERISA's
preemption provision, it fails to implicate the regulatory concerns of ERISA itself. The Congressional declaration of policy, codified at 29 U. S. C. § 1001, states that ERISA was enacted because Congress found it desirable that "disclosure be
made and safeguards be provided with respect to the establishment, operation, and administration of [employee benefit]
plans." I d., at § 1001(a). Representative Dent, the House
sponsor of the legislation, represented that ERISA's fiduciary standards "will prevent abuses of the special responsibilities borne by those dealing with plans." 120 Cong. Rec.
29197 (1974). Senator Williams, the Senate sponsor, stated
that these standards would safeguard employees from "such
abuses as self-dealing, imprudent investing, and misappro' Appellant notes that death benefits sometimes involve a one-time payment to beneficiaries, and that ERISA nonetheless defines an employee
welfare benefit plan to include a program that pays such benefits. 29
U. S. C. § 1002(1). Thus, it contends, the fact that the Maine statute requires a single payment does not mean that the statute does not establish a
plan. This argument, however, misunderstands what it is that makes a
plan a plan. While death benefits may represent a one-time payment from
the perspective of the beneficiaries, the employer clearly foresees the need
to make regular payments to survivors on an ongoing basis. The ongoing,
predictable nature of this obligation therefore creates the need for an administrative scheme to process claims and pay out benefits, whether those
benefits are received by beneficiaries in a lump sum or on a periodic basis.
This is borne out by the fact that death benefits are included in appellant's
retirement plan, with instructions on how eligibility is to be determined,
benefit levels calculated, and disbursements made. App. 54-56. By contrast, appellant's statutory obligation did not prompt the establishment of
any payment program, since there were no ongoing benefits to be paid.
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priation of plan funds." ld., at 29932 (1974). The focus of
the statute thus is on the administrative integrity of benefit
plans-which presumes that some type of administrative activity is taking place. See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 1785, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 46 ("In electing deliberately to preclude state
authority over these plans, Congress acted to insure uniformity of regulation with respect to their activities'); 120 Cong.
Rec. 29197 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dent) (disclosure and reporting requirements "will enable both participants and the
Federal Government to monitor the plans' operations") (emphasis added); id., at 29935 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits)
(disclosure meant to provide employees information "covering in detail the fiscal operations of their plan") (emphasis
added).
The foregoing makes clear both why ERISA is concerned
with regulating benefit "plans," and why the Maine statute
does not establish one. Only "plans" involve administrative
activity potentially subject to employer abuse. The obligation imposed by Maine generates no such activity. There is
no occasion to determine whether a "plan" is "operated" in
the interest of its beneficiaries, because nothing is "operated." No financial transactions take place that would be
listed in an annual report, and no further information regarding the terms of the severance pay obligation is needed because the statute itself makes these terms clear. It would
make no sense for preemption to clear the way for exclusive
federal regulation, for there would be nothing to regulate.
Under such circumstances, preemption would in no way
serve the overall purpose of ERISA.
D

Appellant contends that failure to preempt the Maine law
will create the opportunity for employers to circumvent
ERISA's regulatory requirements by persuading a State to
require the type of benefit plan that the employer otherwise
would establish on its own. That may be so under the ra-
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tionale offered by the state Supreme Court, but that is not
the rationale on which we rely today.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court rested its decision on
the premise that ERISA only preempts state regU.lation of
preexisting benefit plans established by the employer, and
not state-mandated benefit plans. We agree that such an
approach would afford employers a readily available means of
evading ERISA's regulatory scope, thereby depriving employees of the protections of that statute. In addition, it
would permit States to circumvent ERISA's preemption provision, by allowing them to require directly what they are
forbidden to regulate. In contrast, our analysis of the purpose of ERISA preemption makes clear why the mere fact
that a plan is required by a State is insufficient to fend off
preemption. The requirements imposed by a State's establishment of a benefit plan would pose a formidable barrier to
the development of a uniform set of administrative practices.
As Agsalud, supra, illustrates, an employer would be put to
the choice of operating separate ongoing benefit plans or a
single plan subject to different regulatory requirements, and
would face the prospect that numerous other States would
impose their own distinct requirements-a result squarely inconsistent with the goal of ERISA preemption.
Appellant's arguments are thus well taken insofar as they
are addressed to the reasoning of the court below. We have
demonstrated, supra, however, they have no force with respect to a state statute that, as here, does not establish a
plan. Such a statute generates no program activity that normally would be subject to ERISA regulation. Enforcement
of the Maine statute presents no risk either that an employer
will evade or that a State will dislodge otherwise applicable
federal regulatory requirements. Nor is there any prospect
that an employer will face difficulty in operating a unified.administrative scheme for paying benefits. The rationale on
which we rely thus does not create the dangers that appellant
contends will result from upholding the Maine law.
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Appellant also argues that its contention that the ~r
under the Maine statute is an ERISA plan is
supported by Holland v. BurlingtonJndusJ;;ies, 772 F. 2d
1140 (CA4 1985), aff'd mem., =-t:J.s. -=: (1986), and Gilbert v. Burlington Industries, 765 F. 2d 320 (CA2 1985), aff'd
mem., - - U. S. - - (1986).
We disagree."''-. Those cases
II
hold that a plan that pa s seve ance benefits out of general
a_§s ~s is an ERISA: p an. That holding 1s complete y consistent with our 'a"'narysis above. There was no question in
the Burlington cases, as there is in this case, whether the
employer had a "plan"; 10 there was a "plan" and the only issue
was whether the type of benefits paid by that plan are among
those covered by ERISA. The pr~cise question w~ simply
whet~ts paid by a plan out of general assets, rather than out of a trust fund, should be regarded as
employee welfare benefits under 29 U. S. C. § 1002. 11
The courts' conclusion that they should be so regarded took
into account ERISA's central focus on administrative integrity: if an employer has an administrative scheme for paying
benefits, it should not be able to evade the requirements of
the statute merely by paying those benefits out of general assets. Some severence benefit obligations by their nature necessitate an ongoing administrative scheme, but others do

an~bli@.tion

10
The employer had made a commitment to pay severance benefits to employees as each person left employment. This commitment created the
need for ~ to pay these benefits on an ongoing
basis, and the company had distributed both a Policy Manual and Employees' Handbook that provided details on matters such as eligibility, benefit
levels, and payment schedules. 772 F. 2d, at 1143-1144 and n. 1; 765 F.
2d, at 323. The fact that the employer had not complied with the requirements of ERISA in operating this scheme therefore does not, as the dissent contends, post, a t - , mean that no such program for paying benefits was in existence.
"The question arose because§ 1002(1)(B) provides that an employee welfare benefit plan includes a plan that provides benefits described in 29
U. S. C. § 186(c). The latter section lists, inter alia, money paid by an
employer to a trust fund for severance benefits.
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not. Those that do not, such as the obligation imposed in
this case, simply do not involve a state law that "relate[s] to"
an employee benefit "plan." 29 U. S. C. § 1144(a). 12 The
Burlington cases therefore do not support appellant's
argument.
E

ERISA preemption analysis "must be guided by respect
for the separate spheres of governmental authority preserved in our federalist system." Alessi v. RaybestosManhattan, Inc., 451 U. S. 504, 522 (1981). The argument
that ERISA preempts state laws relating to certain employee benefits, rather than to employee benefit plans, is refuted by the express language of the statute, the purposes of
the preemption provision, and the regulatory focus of ERISA
as a whole. If a State creates no prospect of conflict with a
federal statute, there is no warrant for disabling it from attempting to address uniquely local social and economic problems. 13 Since the Maine severance payment statute raises no
danger of such conflict, we hold that the statute is not preempted by ERISA.
12

Thus, if a State required a benefit whose regularity of payment necessarily required an ongoin~ ~nefit ptogr.am, it could not evade preemption
by the simple expedient of somehow formally characterizing the obligation
as a one-time lump-sum payment triggered by the occurrence of a certain
contingency. It is therefore not the case, as the dissent argues, post, at
- - , that a State could dictate the payment of numerous employee benefits "by simply characterizing them as non-'administrative'. " Post, at
13

During the decade between 1971 and 1981, a total of 107 plants were
closed in Maine, resulting in the direct loss of 21 ,215 jobs. Leightor'i, Plant
Closings in Maine: Law and Reality, in Plant Closing Legislation 1 (A.
Aboud ed. , 1984). Taking into account the multiplier effects of these job
losses on the local communities, it is estimated that the total number of
jobs lost in Maine during this period was 49,219. ld., at 3. These losses
were concentrated in the poorer counties of the State and in the lower
wage industries, resulting in a significant burden on local public and private social service agencies. ld., at 4.
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III
Appellant also contends that Maine's statute is preempted
by the NLRA. In so arguing, the Company relies on the
strand of NLRA preemption analysis that forbids States
from "imposing additional restrictions on economic weapons
of self-help." Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los
Angeles,-- U. S. - - , - - (1986). 14 Restriction on state
activity in this area rests on the theory that preemption is
necessary to further Congress' intent that "the conduct involved be unregulated because left 'to be controlled by the
free play of economic forces."' Machinists v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U. S. 132, 140 (1976)
(quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch co., 404 U. S. 138, 144
(1971)).
Appellant concedes that, unlike cases in which state laws
have been struck down under this doctrine, Maine has not directly regulated any economic activity of either of the parties. See, e. g., Machinists, supra, (State enjoined union
members from continuing to refuse to work overtime); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485 (1953) (State enjoined
union picketing). Nor has the State sought directly to force
a party to forgo the use of one of its economic weapons. See,
e. g., Golden State Transit, supra, (City Council conditioned
taxicab franchise renewal on settlement of strike). Nonetheless, appellant maintains that the Maine law intrudes on
the bargaining activities of the parties because the prospect
of a statutory obligation undercuts an employer's ability to
withstand a union's demand for severance pay.
This argument-that a State's establishment of minimum
substantive labor standards undercuts collective bargaining-was considered and rejected in Metropolitan Life,
supra. That case involved a state law requiring that
minimumum mental health benefits be provided under cer" The National Labor Relations Act contains no express preemption
provision.
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tain health insurance policies. Appellants there presented
the same argument that appellant makes in this case: "because Congress intended to leave the choice of terms in collective-bargaining agreements to the free play of economic
forces, ... mandated-benefit laws should be preempted by
the NLRA." 471 U. S., at 748. The Court held, however,
that the NLRA is concerned with ensuring an equitable bargaining process, not with the substantive terms that may
emerge from such bargaining. "The evil Congress was addressing thus was entirely unrelated to local or federal regulation establishing minimum terms of employment." I d., at
754. Such regulation provides protections to individual
union and non-union workers alike, and thus "neither encourage[s] nor discourage[s] the collective-bargaining processes
that are the subject of the NLRA." I d., at 755. Furthermore, preemption should not be lightly inferred in this area,
since the establishment of labor standards falls within the
traditional police power of the State. As a result, held the
Court, "[ w]hen a state law establishes a minimal employment
standard not inconsistent with the general legislative goals of
the NLRA, it conflicts with none of the purposes of the Act."
I d., at 757. It is true that the Maine statute gives employees something for which they otherwise might have to bargain. That is true, however, with regard to any state law
that substantively regulates employment conditions. Both
employers and employees come to the bargaining table with
rights under state law that form a "backdrop" for their negotiations. Ibid. (quoting Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 397
U. S. 223, 228 (1970) (concurring opinion)). Absent a collective bargaining agreement, for instance, state common law
generally permits an employer to run the workplace as it
wishes. The employer enjoys this authority without having
to bargain for it. The parties may enter negotiations designed to alter this state of affairs, but, if impasse is reached,
the employer may rely on preexisting state law to justify its
authority to make employment decisions; that same state law
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defines the rights and duties of employees. Similarly, Maine
provides that employer and employees may negotiate with
the intention of establishing severance pay terms. If impasse is reached, however, preexisting state law determines
the right of employees to a certain level of severance pay and
the duty of the employer to provide it. Thus, the mere fact
that a state statute pertains to matters over which the parties are free to bargain cannot support a claim of preemption,
for "there is nothing in the NLRA . . . which expressly forecloses all state regulatory power with respect to those issues
... that may be the subject of collective bargaining." Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U. S. 497, 504-505 (1978).
Appellant maintains that this case is distinguishable from
Metropolitan Life. It points out that, unlike Metropolitan
Life, the statutory obligation at issue here is optional, since it
applies only in the absence of an agreement between employer and employees. Therefore, the Company argues, the
Maine law cannot be regarded as establishing a genuine minimum labor standard. The fact that the parties are free to
devise their own severance pay arrangements, however,
strengthens the case that the statute works no intrusion on
collective bargaining. Maine has sought to balance the desirability of a particular substantive labor standard against
the right of self-determination regarding the terms and conditions of employment. If a statute that permits no collective bargaining on a subject escapes NLRA preemption, see
Metropolitan Life, surely one that permits such bargaining
cannot be preempted. 15
16
Appellant also contends that, unlike the statute in Metropolitan Life,
the Maine law does not fall equally upon union and non-union employees.
Non-union employers, it argues, are free unilaterally to escape their statutory obligation by establishing severance payment levels, while unionized
employers must engage in collective bargaining in order to achieve the
same result. Any difference in the ease of establishing alternative severance payment obligations, however, flows not from the statute, but from
the basic fact that a non-union employer is freer to set employment terms
than is a unionized employer.
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We therefore find that Maine's severance payment law is
"a valid and unexceptional exercise of the [State's] police
power." Metropolitan Life, supra, at 758. Since "Congress
developed the framework for self-organization and collective
bargaining of the NLRA within the larger body of state law
promoting public health and safety," ibid., the Maine statute
is not preempted by the NLRA. 16
IV
We hold that the Maine severance pay statute is not preempted by ERISA, since it does not "relate to any employee
benefit plan" under that statute. 29 U. S. C.§ 1144(a). We
hold further that the law is not preempted by the NLRA,
since its establishment of a minimum labor standard does not
impermissibly intrude upon the collective bargaining process.
The judgment of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court is
therefore
Affirmed.
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We also find no support for an argument of preemption under the rule
established in San Diego Building Trades v. Garmon, 359 v. 236 (1959),
since the Maine statute does not purport to regulate any conduct subject to
regulation by the National Labor Relations Board. See Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts , 471 U. S. 724, 748-749 (1985).
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